Attacking (EC)DSA scheme with ephemeral keys sharing specific bits

In this paper, we present a deterministic attack on (EC)DSA signature scheme, providing that several signatures are known such that the corresponding ephemeral keys share a certain amount of bits without knowing their value. By eliminating the shared blocks of bits between the ephemeral keys, we get...

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Vydané v:Theoretical computer science Ročník 1001; s. 114578
Hlavní autori: Adamoudis, M., Draziotis, K.A., Poulakis, D.
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:English
Vydavateľské údaje: Elsevier B.V 27.06.2024
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ISSN:0304-3975, 1879-2294
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Shrnutí:In this paper, we present a deterministic attack on (EC)DSA signature scheme, providing that several signatures are known such that the corresponding ephemeral keys share a certain amount of bits without knowing their value. By eliminating the shared blocks of bits between the ephemeral keys, we get a lattice of dimension equal to the number of signatures having a vector containing the private key. We compute an upper bound for the distance of this vector from a target vector, and next, using Kannan's enumeration algorithm, we determine it and hence the secret key. The attack can be made highly efficient by appropriately selecting the number of shared bits and the number of signatures.
ISSN:0304-3975
1879-2294
DOI:10.1016/j.tcs.2024.114578