Discrete hotelling pure location games: potentials and equilibria

We study two-player one-dimensional discrete Hotelling pure location games assuming that demand f ( d ) as a function of distance d is constant or strictly decreasing. We show that this game admits a best-response potential. This result holds in particular for f ( d ) = w d with 0 < w ≤ 1. For th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:ESAIM. Proceedings and surveys Vol. 71; pp. 163 - 174
Main Authors: Iimura, Takuya, von Mouche, Pierre
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Les Ulis EDP Sciences 01.08.2021
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ISSN:2267-3059, 2267-3059
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Summary:We study two-player one-dimensional discrete Hotelling pure location games assuming that demand f ( d ) as a function of distance d is constant or strictly decreasing. We show that this game admits a best-response potential. This result holds in particular for f ( d ) = w d with 0 < w ≤ 1. For this case special attention will be given to the structure of the equilibrium set and a conjecture about the increasingness of best-response correspondences will be made. Nous étudions les jeux de localisation pure Hotelling discrets unidimensionnels à deux joueurs en supposant que la demande f ( d ) en fonction de la distance d est constante ou strictement décroissante. Nous montrons que ce jeu admet un potentiel de meilleure réponse. Ce ŕesultat vaut notamment pour f ( d ) = w d avec 0 < w ≤ 1. Dans ce cas, une attention particulière sera accordée à la structure de l’ensemble d’équilibre et une conjecture sur la croissance de la correspondance de meilleure réponse sera faite.
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ISSN:2267-3059
2267-3059
DOI:10.1051/proc/202171163