More Than You Wanted to Know The Failure of Mandated Disclosure

Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure-requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor's consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, th...

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Hauptverfasser: Omri Ben-Shahar, Carl E. Schneider
Format: E-Book Buch
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Princeton, N.J Princeton University Press 2014
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ISBN:9780691161709, 0691161704, 9780691170886, 0691170886, 9781400850389, 140085038X
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Abstract Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure-requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor's consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, the form, and the papers is supposed to equip you to choose your purchase, your treatment, and your loan well.More Than You Wanted to Knowsurveys the evidence and finds that mandated disclosure rarely works. But how could it? Who reads these disclosures? Who understands them? Who uses them to make better choices? Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider put the regulatory problem in human terms. Most people find disclosures complex, obscure, and dull. Most people make choices by stripping information away, not layering it on. Most people find they can safely ignore most disclosures and that they lack the literacy to analyze them anyway. And so many disclosures are mandated that nobody could heed them all. Nor can all this be changed by simpler forms in plainer English, since complex things cannot be made simple by better writing. Furthermore, disclosure is a lawmakers' panacea, so they keep issuing new mandates and expanding old ones, often instead of taking on the hard work of writing regulations with bite. Timely and provocative,More Than You Wanted to Knowtakes on the form of regulation we encounter daily and asks why we must encounter it at all.
AbstractList Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure-requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor's consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, the form, and the papers is supposed to equip you to choose your purchase, your treatment, and your loan well.More Than You Wanted to Knowsurveys the evidence and finds that mandated disclosure rarely works. But how could it? Who reads these disclosures? Who understands them? Who uses them to make better choices? Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider put the regulatory problem in human terms. Most people find disclosures complex, obscure, and dull. Most people make choices by stripping information away, not layering it on. Most people find they can safely ignore most disclosures and that they lack the literacy to analyze them anyway. And so many disclosures are mandated that nobody could heed them all. Nor can all this be changed by simpler forms in plainer English, since complex things cannot be made simple by better writing. Furthermore, disclosure is a lawmakers' panacea, so they keep issuing new mandates and expanding old ones, often instead of taking on the hard work of writing regulations with bite. Timely and provocative,More Than You Wanted to Knowtakes on the form of regulation we encounter daily and asks why we must encounter it at all.
No detailed description available for "More Than You Wanted to Know".
Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure—requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor’s consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, the form, and the papers is supposed to equip you to choose your purchase, your treatment, and your loan well. More Than You Wanted to Know surveys the evidence and finds that mandated disclosure rarely works. But how could it? Who reads these disclosures? Who understands them? Who uses them to make better choices? Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider put the regulatory problem in human terms. Most people find disclosures complex, obscure, and dull. Most people make choices by stripping information away, not layering it on. Most people find they can safely ignore most disclosures and that they lack the literacy to analyze them anyway. And so many disclosures are mandated that nobody could heed them all. Nor can all this be changed by simpler forms in plainer English, since complex things cannot be made simple by better writing. Furthermore, disclosure is a lawmakers’ panacea, so they keep issuing new mandates and expanding old ones, often instead of taking on the hard work of writing regulations with bite. Timely and provocative, More Than You Wanted to Know takes on the form of regulation we encounter daily and asks why we must encounter it at all.
How mandated disclosure took over the regulatory landscape—and why it failed Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure—requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor's consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, the form, and the papers is supposed to equip you to choose your purchase, your treatment, and your loan well. More Than You Wanted to Know surveys the evidence and finds that mandated disclosure rarely works. But how could it? Who reads these disclosures? Who understands them? Who uses them to make better choices? Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider put the regulatory problem in human terms. Most people find disclosures complex, obscure, and dull. Most people make choices by stripping information away, not layering it on. Most people find they can safely ignore most disclosures and that they lack the literacy to analyze them anyway. And so many disclosures are mandated that nobody could heed them all. Nor can all this be changed by simpler forms in plainer English, since complex things cannot be made simple by better writing. Furthermore, disclosure is a lawmakers' panacea, so they keep issuing new mandates and expanding old ones, often instead of taking on the hard work of writing regulations with bite. Timely and provocative, More Than You Wanted to Know takes on the form of regulation we encounter daily and asks why we must encounter it at all.
Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosurerequiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctors consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, the form, and the papers is supposed to equip you to choose your purchase, your treatment, and your loan well. More Than You Wanted to Know surveys the evidence and finds that mandated disclosure rarely works. But how could it? Who reads these disclosures? Who understands them? Who uses them to make better choices? Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider put the regulatory problem in human terms. Most people find disclosures complex, obscure, and dull. Most people make choices by stripping information away, not layering it on. Most people find they can safely ignore most disclosures and that they lack the literacy to analyze them anyway. And so many disclosures are mandated that nobody could heed them all. Nor can all this be changed by simpler forms in plainer English, since complex things cannot be made simple by better writing. Furthermore, disclosure is a lawmakers panacea, so they keep issuing new mandates and expanding old ones, often instead of taking on the hard work of writing regulations with bite. Timely and provocative, More Than You Wanted to Know takes on the form of regulation we encounter daily and asks why we must encounter it at all.
Author Omri Ben-Shahar
Carl E. Schneider
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Keywords Finance charge
Customer
Interest rate
Explanation
Disaster
Tax
Mortgage loan
Complexity
Privacy
Debtor
Debt
Recommendation (European Union)
Consumer
Expense
Statute
Ideology
Full disclosure (computer security)
Junk Fees
Advertising
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Pension
Warranty
Trade-off
Negative amortization
Inference
Consumer protection
Saving
Disclaimer
Market failure
Discretion
Jurisdiction
Miranda warning
Requirement
Deliberation
Payment
Publicity
Privacy policy
Opt-out
Tort
Innumeracy (book)
Contract
Creditor
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
Numeracy
Hygiene
Predatory lending
Uncertainty
Issuer
Fraud
Literacy
Overdraft
Attempt
Employment
Paperwork Reduction Act
Respondent
Decision aids
Adjustable-rate mortgage
Credit card
Intermediary
Arbitration
Physician
Clery Act
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
Restaurant
Reasonable person
Insurance
Writing
Informed consent
Investor
Prostate cancer
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Notes Illustrations of paperback: monochrome
Includes index
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Snippet Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure-requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is...
How mandated disclosure took over the regulatory landscape—and why it failed Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated...
Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure—requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information....
No detailed description available for "More Than You Wanted to Know".
Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosurerequiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is...
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walterdegruyter
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SubjectTerms Adjustable-rate mortgage
Advertising
Arbitration
Attempt
Clery Act
Complexity
Consumer
Consumer protection
Consumer protection -- Law and legislation -- United States
Contract
Credit card
Creditor
Customer
Debt
Debtor
Decision aids
Decision making
Decision making -- United States
Deliberation
Disaster
Disclaimer
Disclosure of information
Disclosure of information -- Law and legislation -- United States
Discretion
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
Employment
Expense
Explanation
Finance charge
Fraud
Full disclosure (computer security)
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
Hygiene
Ideology
Inference
Informed consent
Innumeracy (book)
Insurance
Interest rate
Intermediary
Investor
Issuer
Junk Fees
Jurisdiction
LAW
LAW / Consumer
Law and legislation
Literacy
Market failure
Miranda warning
Mortgage loan
Negative amortization
Numeracy
Opt-out
Overdraft
Paperwork Reduction Act
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Payment
Pension
Physician
POLITICAL SCIENCE
POLITICAL SCIENCE / Public Policy / General
Predatory lending
Privacy
Privacy policy
Prostate cancer
Public Policy
Publicity
Reasonable person
Recommendation (European Union)
Requirement
Respondent
Restaurant
Saving
Statute
Tax
Tort
Trade-off
Uncertainty
United States
Warranty
Writing
Subtitle The Failure of Mandated Disclosure
TableOfContents Front Matter Table of Contents PREFACE CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 2: COMPLEX DECISIONS, COMPLEX DISCLOSURES CHAPTER 3: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE [PART II Introduction] CHAPTER 4: “WHATEVER”: CHAPTER 5: READING DISCLOSURES CHAPTER 6: THE QUANTITY QUESTION CHAPTER 7: FROM DISCLOSURE TO DECISION CHAPTER 8: MAKE IT SIMPLE? [Illustrations] CHAPTER 9: THE POLITICS OF DISCLOSURE CHAPTER 10: PRODUCING DISCLOSURES CHAPTER 11: AT WORST, HARMLESS? CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION: NOTES INDEX
Chapter 7. From Disclosure to Decision Chapter 6. The Quantity Question Chapter 5. Reading Disclosures Chapter 4. “Whatever”: The Psychology of Mandated Disclosure PART II—WHY DISCLOSURES FAIL Chapter 3. The Failure of Mandated Disclosure Chapter 2. Complex Decisions, Complex Disclosures PART I—THE UBIQUITY OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE Chapter 1. Introduction CONTENTS Preface Cover Title Page, Copyright, Dedication Chapter 11. At Worst, Harmless? Chapter 10. Producing Disclosures Chapter 9. The Politics of Disclosure Chapter 8. Make It Simple? PART III—CAN MANDATED DISCLOSURE BE SAVED? Notes Index Chapter 12 Conclusion: Beyond Disclosurism
Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- CONTENTS -- Preface -- PART I-THE UBIQUITY OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- Chapter 2 Complex Decisions, Complex Disclosures -- Chapter 3 The Failure of Mandated Disclosure -- PART II-WHY DISCLOSURES FAIL -- Chapter 4 "Whatever": The Psychology of Mandated Disclosure -- Chapter 5 Reading Disclosures -- Chapter 6 The Quantity Question -- Chapter 7 From Disclosure to Decision -- PART III-CAN MANDATED DISCLOSURE BE SAVED? -- Chapter 8 Make It Simple? -- Chapter 9 The Politics of Disclosure -- Chapter 10 Producing Disclosures -- Chapter 11 At Worst, Harmless? -- Chapter 12 Conclusion: Beyond Disclosurism -- Notes -- Index
Part I. The Ubiquity of Mandated Disclosure --
8. Make It Simple?
2. Complex Decisions, Complex Disclosures
7. From Disclosure to Decision
Index
3. The Failure of Mandated Disclosure
-
11. At Worst, Harmless?
/
Contents
6. The Quantity Question
5. Reading Disclosures
1. Introduction
Frontmatter --
Part III. Can Mandated Disclosure Be Saved? --
9. The Politics of Disclosure
Preface
Part II. Why Disclosures Fail --
12. Conclusion: Beyond Disclosurism
4. “Whatever”: The Psychology of Mandated Disclosure
10. Producing Disclosures
Notes
Title More Than You Wanted to Know
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