More Than You Wanted to Know The Failure of Mandated Disclosure

Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure-requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor's consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Omri Ben-Shahar, Carl E. Schneider
Format:	eBook Book
Language:	English
Published:	Princeton, N.J Princeton University Press 2014
Edition:	1
Subjects:	Adjustable-rate mortgage Advertising Arbitration Attempt Clery Act Complexity Consumer Consumer protection Consumer protection > Law and legislation > United States Contract Credit card Creditor Customer Debt Debtor Decision aids Decision making Decision making > United States Deliberation Disaster Disclaimer Disclosure of information Disclosure of information > Law and legislation > United States Discretion Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Employment Expense Explanation Finance charge Fraud Full disclosure (computer security) Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Hygiene Ideology Inference Informed consent Innumeracy (book) Insurance Interest rate Intermediary Investor Issuer Junk Fees Jurisdiction LAW LAW / Consumer Law and legislation Literacy Market failure Miranda warning Mortgage loan Negative amortization Numeracy Opt-out Overdraft Paperwork Reduction Act Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Payment Pension Physician POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SCIENCE / Public Policy / General Predatory lending Privacy Privacy policy Prostate cancer Public Policy Publicity Reasonable person Recommendation (European Union) Requirement Respondent Restaurant Saving Statute Tax Tort Trade-off Uncertainty United States Warranty Writing Finance charge Customer Interest rate Explanation Disaster Tax Mortgage loan Complexity Privacy Debtor Debt Recommendation (European Union) Consumer Expense Statute Ideology Full disclosure (computer security) Junk Fees Advertising Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Pension Warranty Trade-off Negative amortization Inference Consumer protection Saving Disclaimer Market failure Discretion Jurisdiction Miranda warning Requirement Deliberation Payment Publicity Privacy policy Opt-out Tort Innumeracy (book) Contract Creditor Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Numeracy Hygiene Predatory lending Uncertainty Issuer Fraud Literacy Overdraft Attempt Employment Paperwork Reduction Act Respondent Decision aids Adjustable-rate mortgage Credit card Intermediary Arbitration Physician Clery Act Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Restaurant Reasonable person Insurance Writing Informed consent Investor Prostate cancer
ISBN:	9780691161709, 0691161704, 9780691170886, 0691170886, 9781400850389, 140085038X
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure-requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor's consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, the form, and the papers is supposed to equip you to choose your purchase, your treatment, and your loan well.More Than You Wanted to Knowsurveys the evidence and finds that mandated disclosure rarely works. But how could it? Who reads these disclosures? Who understands them? Who uses them to make better choices? Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider put the regulatory problem in human terms. Most people find disclosures complex, obscure, and dull. Most people make choices by stripping information away, not layering it on. Most people find they can safely ignore most disclosures and that they lack the literacy to analyze them anyway. And so many disclosures are mandated that nobody could heed them all. Nor can all this be changed by simpler forms in plainer English, since complex things cannot be made simple by better writing. Furthermore, disclosure is a lawmakers' panacea, so they keep issuing new mandates and expanding old ones, often instead of taking on the hard work of writing regulations with bite. Timely and provocative,More Than You Wanted to Knowtakes on the form of regulation we encounter daily and asks why we must encounter it at all.
Bibliography:	Illustrations of paperback: monochrome Includes index
ISBN:	9780691161709 0691161704 9780691170886 0691170886 9781400850389 140085038X
DOI:	10.1515/9781400850389