The Nuclear Taboo The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945
Why have nuclear weapons not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? Nina Tannenwald disputes the conventional answer of 'deterrence' in favour of what she calls a nuclear taboo - a widespread inhibition on using nuclear weapons - which has arisen in global politics. Drawing on new...
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| Hlavný autor: | |
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| Médium: | E-kniha Kniha |
| Jazyk: | English |
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Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
20.12.2007
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| Vydanie: | 1 |
| Edícia: | Cambridge studies in international relations |
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| ISBN: | 9780521818865, 0521818869, 0521524288, 9780521524285 |
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- Cover -- Half-title -- Series-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction: the tradition of nuclear non-use -- The unexpected tradition of non-use -- The challenge of explaining non-use -- The nuclear taboo -- What makes it a taboo? -- A taboo and not simply a "tradition -- Evaluating the role of the taboo -- The origins of the taboo -- Why the United States? -- Implications -- Plan of the book -- 2 Explaining non-use -- Competing explanations for nuclear non-use -- Deterrence -- Non-deterrence explanations -- Shadow of the future -- Nuclear weapons lacked utility -- Non-deterrence material constraints -- The obsolescence of war -- Beyond material explanations: a nuclear taboo -- How norms work: three normative effects -- Mechanisms of normative influence -- Material constraints versus the taboo argument -- Explaining the rise of the nuclear taboo -- Characteristics of the nuclear taboo -- Anomalies for conventional explanations of the taboo -- Explanation of the taboo -- Research design and methods -- Conclusion: norms and deterrence -- 3 Hiroshima and the origins of the nuclear taboo -- The initial precedent -- Hiroshima and Nagasaki: the legitimacy of the bomb -- The momentum toward use -- The legitimacy of the bomb -- The legacy of Hiroshima -- The early postwar years: relief and uncertainty -- The initial response: The legitimacy and justice of use -- Constructing the legitimacy of the bomb -- Precursors to the taboo: two competing precedents -- The role of radiation and the poison gas analogy -- Categorization and the creation of precedents -- Truman's early precedents -- The UN and collective delegitimization of atomic weapons -- The creation of categories: "Weapons of mass destruction -- The prohibition on preventive war -- Developing a policy of use -- Conclusion
- 4 The Korean War: the emerging taboo -- Truman and the Korean War -- Initial considerations -- The United Nations as a restraining influence -- The crisis continues -- The explanation for non-use -- Declining escalation risks -- Political and normative constraints -- Indirect effects of an emerging taboo: Military utility and the issue of suitable targets -- Challenging the emerging taboo -- Eisenhower and Dulles -- The strategic and policy context -- The pursuit of the freedom to use -- How did the taboo matter? -- Conclusion -- 5 The rise of the nuclear taboo, 1953-1960 -- Stigmatizing the bomb -- The grassroots antinuclear weapons movement -- The contribution of the antinuclear weapons movement -- Delegitimation politics: Disarmament diplomacy at the UN -- Normative power politics: the Soviet campaign against nuclear weapons -- The emerging US reliance on "use": the effort to conventionalize tactical nuclear weapons -- The normative strategy -- Defending the legality of atomic weapons -- Operational planning for use of nuclear weapons in local wars -- The conventionalization campaign continues -- The propaganda war: The United States government fights back -- Efforts to create a more favorable public attitude toward nuclear weapons -- The failure of conventionalization: The taboo starts to win out -- Why the taboo prevailed -- Conclusion -- 6 Nuclear weapons and the Vietnam.War -- The Johnson administration and Vietnam -- Background: US nuclear doctrine -- Initial considerations -- Disagreement over escalation risks -- Political and normative concerns -- The 1964 Ball memo: The political costs of using nuclear weapons -- Challenging the taboo -- The 1966 Jason Report: Assessing the military utility of tactical nuclear weapons -- Did the study have any effect? -- The war escalates -- Khe Sanh -- Public opinion -- Nixon and Kissinger
- The taboo and the nuclear non-proliferation regime -- The nuclear taboo and the standard of civilization -- The challenge from the South -- The 1995 NPT extension conference -- Coalitions of the weak -- The geographical spread of non-use: nuclear-weapons-free zones -- The return of the abolition movement -- Global societal pressure takes nuclear weapons to court: The 1996 World Court Advisory Opinion -- Public opinion -- Footdragging on disarmament -- Conclusion -- 10 Conclusion: the prospects for the nuclear taboo -- The historical development of the taboo -- Alternative explanations -- Implications for theory -- The role of norms: the effects of the taboo -- Beyond rationalism -- How generalizable? -- To other weapons -- To other nations -- To non-state actors -- The future of the nuclear taboo -- Limits to the delegitimization of nuclear weapons -- Lessons of the nuclear taboo -- Lessons for researchers -- Lessons for practitioners -- Beyond the nuclear taboo -- Select bibliography -- Interviews -- Primary sources -- Published (government) documents -- Memoirs -- Books, articles -- Index
- Vietnam contingency planning -- Operation Duck Hook -- Spring 1972: In final pursuit of the knock-out blow -- Conclusion -- 7 Institutionalizing the taboo, 1960-1989 -- Institutionalization and consolidation -- The shift toward institutionalization: The changing strategic and normative context -- The multilateralization of arms control: Pressure for a nuclear ban -- The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the pressure for non-use assurances -- The first legal limitations on use: The creation of the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free zone -- Internalizing the taboo in the US government -- Early rejection of first use of strategic weapons -- Scholarly thinking on no-first-use -- Tactical nuclear weapons and the feasibility of limited nuclear war -- The shift to non-proliferation norms -- The codification of deterrence: US-Soviet arms control -- The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty -- Normative power politics: The 1973 Agreement on Preventing Nuclear War -- The consolidation of the taboo -- The demise of "peaceful nuclear explosions -- The furor over the neutron bomb -- The disarmament movement revives -- The renewed debate over no-first-use -- Reagan and arms control: The taboo survives the Reagan agenda -- The moral challenge to deterrence -- The return of arms control and the further delegitimization of deterrence -- How the taboo helped to stabilize, not undermine, deterrence -- Conclusion -- 8 The 1991 Gulf War -- Nuclear weapons in the Gulf War -- Taboo effects: The taboo itself becomes an "interest -- Public opinion -- Calculated ambiguity: The role of nuclear threats -- Were the nuclear threats effective? -- The nuclear taboo, conventional weapons, and.just-war theory -- Conclusion -- 9 The taboo in the post-Cold War world -- Nuclear developments in the 1990s -- The context: decreasing numbers -- No retreat from use