Achieving Nuclear Ambitions Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation

Despite the global spread of nuclear hardware and knowledge, at least half of the nuclear weapons projects launched since 1970 have definitively failed, and even the successful projects have generally needed far more time than expected. To explain this puzzling slowdown in proliferation, Jacques E....

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Hlavní autor: Hymans, Jacques E. C.
Médium: E-kniha Kniha
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 16.02.2012
Vydání:1
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ISBN:9780521132251, 0521767008, 0521132258, 9780521767002
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  • 3 Spinning in place -- Review of technical assessments of the pre-1991 Iraqi nuclear program -- Pre-war estimates -- The IAEA's estimate -- Kelley's estimate -- Explaining Iraq's nuclear inefficiency: management and institutions -- Iraq's neo-patrimonial state -- The Osiraq myth -- 1981-1987: scientists in power? -- 1987-1988: Hussein Kamel's power grab -- Life under Kamel -- 1990-1991: the crash program -- "If the Gulf War had not intervened …": questioning the premise of the counterfactual -- After 1991: the Iraqi nuclear mirage -- Conclusion -- 4 How did China's nuclear weapons project succeed? -- China's nuclear success is a big social science puzzle -- International deus ex machina? -- Explaining China's nuclear success: three key variables -- Unlimited political support -- Strongly professional organization -- Leadership self-restraint -- Self-restraint or institutional constraint? -- The importance of efficiency: a comparison of China's nuclear weapons project with its nuclear submarine project -- Conclusion -- 5 Proliferation implications of international civil nuclear cooperation: -- Introduction: from domestic to international variables -- Atoms for Peace's growing chorus of critics -- Theorizing the proliferation implications of scientific and technical workers' international ties -- Atoms for Peace in light of the literature on international technology transfer -- Hypotheses on exit, voice, and loyalty in developing country nuclear programs -- A case study: Tito's Yugoslavia -- Yugoslavia's nuclear mismanagement -- Nuclear Yugoslavia's international connections before 1950 -- Yugoslav participation in Atoms for Peace -- International ties and scientific and technical workers' exercise of voice and exit -- From tragedy to farce: Tito's nuclear bomb project, part deux -- Conclusion: thinking beyond the Yugoslav case
  • Cover -- Achieving Nuclear Ambitions -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Figures -- Table -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- 1 The puzzle of declining nuclear weapons project efficiency -- The empirical puzzle of declining nuclear weapons project efficiency -- The simple techno-centric perspective -- More sophisticated techno-centric claims -- The will to go nuclear -- The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) -- Entangling alliances -- Vulnerability to military threats -- Economic resources -- The argument of the book in brief -- Core hypotheses -- A preliminary empirical test -- From state institutionalization to efficiency: a quantitative analysis -- From autonomy to efficiency: evidence from the first five nuclear weapon states -- Bringing implementation back in -- Road map -- 2 A theory of nuclear weapons project efficiency and inefficiency -- The micro level: management approach, worker motivation, and the functioning of nuclear weapons projects -- The top-down model, or, how not to manage a nuclear weapons project -- The bottom-up model, or, how to manage a nuclear weapons project -- Summary: three hypotheses on management and proliferation -- The macro level: efficiency of nuclear weapons projects as a function of state institutionalization -- Defining Weberian legal-rational and neo-patrimonial states -- Weberian legal-rationalism's promotion of scientific and technical professionalism -- Consequences of the "privileged" institutional status of nuclear programs -- The special case of professional military-run nuclear weapons projects -- Changing state institutionalization to create efficient nuclear weapons projects -- The fate of nuclear programs in legal-rationalizing and neo-patrimonializing states -- Summary of the basic causal arguments -- International nuclear cooperation: a shortcut? -- Operationalization and case selection
  • 6 Proliferation implications of footloose nuclear scientists: -- Theorizing the proliferation consequences of footloose nuclear scientists -- The main benefit of hiring foreign talent: knowledge transfer -- The main obstacle to hiring foreign talent: they don't want to come -- Hiring dilemmas -- A historical analogy: the market for alchemists in early modern Europe -- Post-hiring dilemmas -- The difficulty of empirical verification -- Perón's nuclear embarrassment -- The Richter fraud -- Perón's psychological weaknesses -- The Richter affair as a consequence of Perón's assault on Argentine institutions -- Proliferation implications of the Perón-AFA conflict -- Epilogue: after Richter -- Conclusion -- 7 Empirical extensions: -- Libya -- Pakistan -- North Korea -- Iran -- Conclusion -- 8 Lessons for policymakers and directions for future research -- Lessons for policymakers -- Lesson #1: tune out the proliferation alarmists -- Lesson #2: recognize that proliferant states, not the United States or multilateral institutions, are the main protagonists i -- Lesson #3: military counterproliferation policies often backfire -- Lesson #4: give "Atoms for Peace" a chance -- Lesson #5: nonproliferation policy needs to respect individual cases and contexts -- Directions for future research -- References -- Index