Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as input the reported -- rather than the true -- values of the...

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Bibliographic Details

Published in:	arXiv.org
Main Authors:	Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Fusco, Federico, Lazos, Philip, Leonardi, Stefano, Reiffenhäuser, Rebecca
Format:	Paper
Language:	English
Published:	Ithaca Cornell University Library, arXiv.org 11.12.2023
Subjects:	Algorithms Allocations Design of experiments Equilibrium Reagents
ISSN:	2331-8422
Online Access:	Get full text
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