A framework for receding-horizon control in infinite-horizon aggregative games

A novel modelling framework is proposed for the analysis of aggregative games on an infinite-time horizon, assuming that players are subject to heterogeneous periodic constraints. A new aggregative equilibrium notion is presented and the strategic behaviour of the agents is analysed under a receding...

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Veröffentlicht in:	arXiv.org
Hauptverfasser:	Fele, Filiberto, De Paola, Antonio, Angeli, David, Strbac, Goran
Format:	Paper
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	Ithaca Cornell University Library, arXiv.org 01.07.2022
Schlagworte:	Design parameters Discrete time systems Dynamic stability Game theory Games Players Receding horizon principle
ISSN:	2331-8422
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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