A framework for receding-horizon control in infinite-horizon aggregative games

A novel modelling framework is proposed for the analysis of aggregative games on an infinite-time horizon, assuming that players are subject to heterogeneous periodic constraints. A new aggregative equilibrium notion is presented and the strategic behaviour of the agents is analysed under a receding...

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Vydané v:	arXiv.org
Hlavní autori:	Fele, Filiberto, De Paola, Antonio, Angeli, David, Strbac, Goran
Médium:	Paper
Jazyk:	English
Vydavateľské údaje:	Ithaca Cornell University Library, arXiv.org 01.07.2022
Predmet:	Design parameters Discrete time systems Dynamic stability Game theory Games Players Receding horizon principle
ISSN:	2331-8422
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