The nature of physical computation
Computing systems are everywhere today. Even the brain is thought to be a sort of computing system. But what does it mean to say that a given organ or system computes? What is it about laptops, smartphones, and nervous systems that they are deemed to compute, and why does it seldom occur to us to de...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | eBook Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
New York
Oxford University Press
2022
Oxford University Press, Incorporated |
| Edition: | 1 |
| Series: | Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science |
| Subjects: | |
| ISBN: | 0197552382, 9780197552384, 9780197552407, 0197552404 |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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Table of Contents:
- 4.3.2 Attractor Neural Networks -- 4.3.3 A Neural Network for the n- Queens Problem -- 4.3.4 Do Attractor Neural Networks Compute? -- 4.3.5 A Way Out of the Dilemma? -- 4.4 Summary -- 5: Computation as Implementation -- 5.1 Triviality Results -- 5.1.1 Searle's Triviality Results -- 5.1.2 Putnam's Triviality Results -- 5.1.3 Implications of Triviality Results -- 5.2 Avoiding Triviality -- 5.2.1 Chalmers's Account of Implementation -- 5.2.2 Weak Triviality and Its (Non- )Consequences -- 5.2.3 Does Chalmers's Account Avoid the Consequences of Strong Triviality? -- 5.3 From Implementation to Computation -- 5.3.1 Is Implementation Necessary for Computation? -- 5.3.2 Is Implementation Sufficient for Computation? -- 5.4 Summary -- 6: Computation as Mechanism -- 6.1 An Outline of the Mechanistic Account -- 6.2 What Is "Mechanistic" in the Mechanistic Account? -- 6.3 Computational and Mechanistic Explanations -- 6.3.1 Computational and DecompositionalExplanations -- 6.3.2 Abstract Explanations and Structural Properties -- 6.3.3 Computational and Implementational Hierarchies -- 6.3.4 Information Processing and Causal Structure -- 6.3.5 Summary -- 6.4 Rules, Medium- Independence, and Teleological Functions -- 6.5 Summary -- 7: The Semantic View of Computation -- 7.1 What Is a Semantic View of Computation? -- 7.1.1 Essential Involvement -- 7.1.2 Non- Semantic Views -- 7.1.3 Variants of the Semantic View -- 7.1.4 Semantics -- 7.1.5 Non- Semantic Accounts of Semantic Properties -- 7.1.6 What the Semantic View Is Not -- 7.1.7 The Gist of My Account -- 7.1.8 Supporting the Semantic View -- 7.2 Objections to the Semantic View -- 7.3 Summary -- 8: An Argument for the Semantic View -- 8.1 Simultaneous Implementation -- 8.2 The Master Argument: From Simultaneous Implementation to the Semantic Individuation of Computational States
- 8.3 Objection 1: Computational Individuation Is More Basic -- 8.4 Objection 2: Externalism Without Content -- 8.5 Summary -- 9: Computing as Modeling -- 9.1 What Is Modeling? -- 9.1.1 Input- Output Mirroring -- 9.1.2 Input- Output Modeling -- 9.1.3 The Neural Integrator in the Oculomotor System -- 9.1.4 The Neural Integrator as an Internal Model -- 9.2 The Modeling Notion of Computation -- 9.2.1 Modeling and Implementing -- 9.2.2 The Definition of Computing -- 9.2.3 Is Computing Modeling? -- 9.3 Others Who Have Linked Computing to Modeling -- 9.3.1 Grush on Neural Computation -- 9.3.2 Marr on Computational- Level Theories -- 9.3.3 Summary -- 9.4 The Methodological Role of Modeling -- 9.5 Computational Explanations -- 9.5.1 Marr's Computational- Level Explanations -- 9.5.2 Egan's Function- Theoretic Explanations -- 9.5.3 Chirimuuta's Optimality Explanations -- 9.6 Summary -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Bibliography -- Name Index -- Subject Index
- Cover -- The Nature of Physical Computation -- Copyright -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1: Desiderata of a Theory of Computation -- 1.1 Scope -- 1.2 Features -- 1.2.1 Meaning -- 1.2.2 Ontology -- 1.2.3 Utility -- 1.3 Summary -- 2: Turing's Computability -- 2.1 The 1936 Affair -- 2.2 Turing's Analysis -- 2.3 Who Is "the Computer"? -- 2.3.1 Abstractness -- 2.3.2 Idealization: Competence and Performance -- 2.3.3 Cognitive Versus Non- Cognitive -- 2.4 Effective Computability and Machine Computation -- 2.5 Summary -- 3: Preamble to Machine Computation -- 3.1 Gandy's Account of Machine Computation -- 3.1.1 Gandy Machines, Turing Machines, and HUMAN Computers -- 3.1.2 Summary -- 3.2 Generic Computation -- 3.2.1 Infinite- Time Turing Machines -- 3.2.2 Why Infinite- Time Turing Machines Are Not Gandy Machines -- 3.3 Algorithmic Computation -- 3.3.1 What Is an Algorithm? -- 3.3.2 Computational Complexity -- 3.3.3 Algorithmic Machine Computation and Generic Computation -- 3.3.4 Algorithmic Computation and Gandy Machines -- 3.3.5 Summary -- 3.4 Physical Computation -- 3.4.1 What Is Physical? -- 3.4.2 Computability over the Reals -- 3.4.3 Is the Bold Physical Church- Turing Thesis True? -- 3.4.4 Relativistic Computation -- 3.4.5 Does Relativistic Computation Refute the Modest Thesis? -- 3.4.6 Supertasks and Algorithmic Computation -- 3.4.7 Physical Computation and Gandy Machines -- 3.4.8 The Relationship Between Physical and Other Notions of Computation -- 3.5 Summary -- 4: Computation as Step- Satisfaction -- 4.1 Cummins's Account of Computation -- 4.1.1 Satisfaction and Instantiation -- 4.1.2 Step- Satisfaction -- 4.1.3 The Essentials of the Account -- 4.2 Is Step- Satisfaction Necessary for Computation? -- 4.2.1 Pitowsky's Average Machine -- 4.2.2 A Way Out of the Dilemma? -- 4.3 Neural Computation -- 4.3.1 Neural Networks