Fort-NoCs: Mitigating the threat of a compromised NoC

In this paper, we uncover a novel and imminent threat to an emerging computing paradigm: MPSoCs built with 3rd party IP NoCs. We demonstrate that a compromised NoC (C-NoC) can enable a range of security attacks with an accomplice software component. To counteract these threats, we propose Fort-NoCs,...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Proceedings - ACM IEEE Design Automation Conference S. 1 - 6
Hauptverfasser:	Ancajas, Dean Michael, Chakraborty, Koushik, Roy, Sanghamitra
Format:	Tagungsbericht
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	IEEE 01.06.2014
Schlagworte:	Hardware IP networks Measurement Pipelines System-on-chip Trojan horses
ISSN:	0738-100X
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	In this paper, we uncover a novel and imminent threat to an emerging computing paradigm: MPSoCs built with 3rd party IP NoCs. We demonstrate that a compromised NoC (C-NoC) can enable a range of security attacks with an accomplice software component. To counteract these threats, we propose Fort-NoCs, a series of techniques that work together to provide protection from a C-NoC in an MPSoC. Fort-NoCs's foolproof protection disables covert backdoor activation, and reduces the chance of a successful side-channel attack by "clouding" the information obtained by an attacker. Compared to recently proposed techniques, Fort-NoCs offers a substantially better protection with lower overheads.
ISSN:	0738-100X
DOI:	10.1145/2593069.2593144