Fort-NoCs: Mitigating the threat of a compromised NoC

In this paper, we uncover a novel and imminent threat to an emerging computing paradigm: MPSoCs built with 3rd party IP NoCs. We demonstrate that a compromised NoC (C-NoC) can enable a range of security attacks with an accomplice software component. To counteract these threats, we propose Fort-NoCs,...

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Vydáno v:Proceedings - ACM IEEE Design Automation Conference s. 1 - 6
Hlavní autoři: Ancajas, Dean Michael, Chakraborty, Koushik, Roy, Sanghamitra
Médium: Konferenční příspěvek
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: IEEE 01.06.2014
Témata:
Hardware
IP networks
Measurement
Pipelines
System-on-chip
Trojan horses
ISSN:0738-100X
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Shrnutí:In this paper, we uncover a novel and imminent threat to an emerging computing paradigm: MPSoCs built with 3rd party IP NoCs. We demonstrate that a compromised NoC (C-NoC) can enable a range of security attacks with an accomplice software component. To counteract these threats, we propose Fort-NoCs, a series of techniques that work together to provide protection from a C-NoC in an MPSoC. Fort-NoCs's foolproof protection disables covert backdoor activation, and reduces the chance of a successful side-channel attack by "clouding" the information obtained by an attacker. Compared to recently proposed techniques, Fort-NoCs offers a substantially better protection with lower overheads.
ISSN:0738-100X
DOI:10.1145/2593069.2593144