Complexity and the challenges of securing SoCs

There is a growing need to secure cryptographic keys and other secrets on SoCs and other large ASICs. For designers, smaller geometries make it more difficult to predict the precise physical and analog properties of digital logic blocks. In addition, high mask costs make it difficult to tune designs...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:2011 48th ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC) S. 328 - 331
1. Verfasser: Kocher, Paul
Format: Tagungsbericht
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: New York, NY, USA ACM 05.06.2011
IEEE
Schriftenreihe:ACM Conferences
Schlagworte:
antitamper
Complexity theory
differential power analysis
Encryption
General and reference > Document types > Computing standards, RFCs and guidelines
Hardware
hardware security
Power measurement
Security
Security and privacy > Cryptography
Security and privacy > Cryptography > Cryptanalysis and other attacks
Security and privacy > Cryptography > Public key (asymmetric) techniques
Security and privacy > Systems security > Operating systems security
side channel attack
Social and professional topics > Computing > technology policy > Computer crime
Social and professional topics > Professional topics > Computing education > Computing education programs > Computer science education
System-on-a-chip
tamper evidence
tamper resistance
anti-tamper
hardware security
tamper resistance
security
tamper evidence
side channel attack
differential power analysis
ISBN:1450306365, 9781450306362
ISSN:0738-100X
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:There is a growing need to secure cryptographic keys and other secrets on SoCs and other large ASICs. For designers, smaller geometries make it more difficult to predict the precise physical and analog properties of digital logic blocks. In addition, high mask costs make it difficult to tune designs and raise the consequences of failure. For example, side channel attacks such as differential cryptanalysis can easily and noninvasively extract secrets from unprotected SoCs. Vulnerabilities can be difficult to anticipate, since common design and verification tools do not necessarily provide clear visibility into how devices will fail when pushed outside of its normal operational conditions. The security challenges facing the semiconductor industry are also in part educational; while security training is common for software developers, relatively few hardware engineers have specialized security knowledge. Some of these challenges can be mitigated at the architectural level, for example by using cryptographic constructions that provide inherent side-channel resistance irrespective of a device's underlying analog properties.
ISBN:1450306365
9781450306362
ISSN:0738-100X
DOI:10.1145/2024724.2024803