Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Voting
A voting rule decides on a probability distribution over a set of m alternatives, based on rankings of those alternatives provided by agents. We assume that agents have cardinal utility functions over the alternatives, but voting rules have access to only the rankings induced by these utilities. We...
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| Vydané v: | IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc |
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| Hlavní autori: | , , , |
| Médium: | Paper |
| Jazyk: | English |
| Vydavateľské údaje: |
St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
01.01.2022
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