Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Voting

A voting rule decides on a probability distribution over a set of m alternatives, based on rankings of those alternatives provided by agents. We assume that agents have cardinal utility functions over the alternatives, but voting rules have access to only the rankings induced by these utilities. We...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc
Hauptverfasser:	Ebadian, Soroush, Kahng, Anson, Peters, Dominik, Shah, Nisarg
Format:	Paper
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 01.01.2022
Schlagworte:	Approximation Utility functions
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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