Social Influence Diffusion and Coordinated Decision Making on Networks

Essential properties of a social influence network are a) the mechanism by which social influence is diffused throughout the network and b) the mechanism by which social influence is combined to create emergent interrelationships that enable coordinated decision making. Conditional game theory addre...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:2017 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM) pp. 860 - 868
Main Authors: Stirling, Wynn C., Tummolini, Luca
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Published: New York, NY, USA ACM 31.07.2017
Series:ACM Conferences
Subjects:
Applied computing
Applied computing > Law, social and behavioral sciences
Applied computing > Law, social and behavioral sciences > Economics
Computing methodologies
Computing methodologies > Artificial intelligence
Computing methodologies > Artificial intelligence > Distributed artificial intelligence
Computing methodologies > Artificial intelligence > Distributed artificial intelligence > Cooperation and coordination
Computing methodologies > Artificial intelligence > Distributed artificial intelligence > Intelligent agents
Computing methodologies > Artificial intelligence > Distributed artificial intelligence > Multi-agent systems
Computing methodologies > Artificial intelligence > Knowledge representation and reasoning
Information systems
Information systems > Information systems applications
ISBN:1450349935, 9781450349932
ISSN:2473-991X
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Essential properties of a social influence network are a) the mechanism by which social influence is diffused throughout the network and b) the mechanism by which social influence is combined to create emergent interrelationships that enable coordinated decision making. Conditional game theory addresses these issues by a) enabling individuals to invoke conditional preferences to dynamically modulate their preferences in response to the intentions of those who influence them, and b) aggregating the conditional preferences to generate a comprehensive social model that enables agents to coordinate their individual choices. This paper develops an operational definition of coordination and establishes a formal relationship between group level coordination and individual level performance for both acyclical and cyclical social influence networks.
ISBN:1450349935
9781450349932
ISSN:2473-991X
DOI:10.1145/3110025.3116194