A Combinatorial Auction Protocol among Versatile Experts and Amateurs

Auctions have become an integral part of electronic commerce and a promising field for applying multi-agent technologies. Correctly judging the quality of auctioned items is often difficult for amateurs, in particular, in Internet auctions. However, experts can correctly judge the quality of items....

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: Proceedings, 3rd International Joint Conference, New York City, New York, 2004. S. 378 - 385
Hauptverfasser: Ito, Takayuki, Yokoo, Makoto, Matsubara, Shigeo
Format: Tagungsbericht
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Washington, DC, USA IEEE Computer Society 19.07.2004
IEEE
Schriftenreihe:ACM Conferences
Schlagworte:
Applied computing > Electronic commerce > E-commerce infrastructure
Computing methodologies > Artificial intelligence > Distributed artificial intelligence
Electronic commerce
Indium tin oxide
Intelligent systems
Internet
Laboratories
Mathematics of computing > Discrete mathematics > Combinatorics > Combinatorial algorithms
Multiagent systems
Permission
Protocols
Resource management
ISBN:9781581138641, 1581138644
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Auctions have become an integral part of electronic commerce and a promising field for applying multi-agent technologies. Correctly judging the quality of auctioned items is often difficult for amateurs, in particular, in Internet auctions. However, experts can correctly judge the quality of items. In this situation, it is difficult to force experts to tell the truth and attain an efficient allocation since they have a clear advantage over amateurs; without some reward they cannot be expected to reveal their valuable information. In our previous work, we successfully develop such auction protocols under the following two cases: (1) a single-unit auction among experts and amateurs, and (2) a combinatorial auction among single-skilled experts and amateurs. In this paper we focus on versatile experts, who have interest in and expert knowledge of the qualities of several items. In the case of versatile experts, there are several problems, e.g., free riding problems, if we simply extend the previous VCG-style auction protocol. Thus, in this paper, we employ a PORF (price-oriented, rationing-free) protocol for designing our new protocol to realize a strategy-proof auction protocol for experts. In the protocol, the dominant strategy for experts is telling the truth. Also for amateurs, telling the truth is the best response when two or more experts select the dominant strategy. Furthermore, the protocol is false-name-proof.
Bibliographie:SourceType-Conference Papers & Proceedings-1
ObjectType-Conference Paper-1
content type line 25
ISBN:9781581138641
1581138644
DOI:10.5555/1018409.1018770