Strategy/False-name Proof Protocols for Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction

In this paper, we investigate a model of a combinatorial, procurement multi-attribute auction, in which each sales item is defined by several attributes called quality, the buyer is the auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are the bidders. Furthermore, there exist multiple items and both...

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Veröffentlicht in:Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: Proceedings, 3rd International Joint Conference, New York City, New York, 2004. S. 160 - 167
Hauptverfasser: Suyama, Takayuki, Yokoo, Makoto
Format: Tagungsbericht
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Washington, DC, USA IEEE Computer Society 19.07.2004
IEEE
Schriftenreihe:ACM Conferences
Schlagworte:
Autonomous agents
Computing methodologies > Artificial intelligence > Distributed artificial intelligence > Intelligent agents
Electronic commerce
Government
Information science
Internet
Laboratories
Marketing and sales
Mathematics of computing > Discrete mathematics > Combinatorics > Combinatorial algorithms
Permission
Procurement
Protocols
Theory of computation > Randomness, geometry and discrete structures
ISBN:9781581138641, 1581138644
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Zusammenfassung:In this paper, we investigate a model of a combinatorial, procurement multi-attribute auction, in which each sales item is defined by several attributes called quality, the buyer is the auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are the bidders. Furthermore, there exist multiple items and both buyer and sellers can have arbitrary (e.g., substitutable/complementary) preferences on a bundle of items. Our goal is to develop a protocol that is strategy-proof for sellers. We first present a VCG-type protocol. As in a standard combinatorial auction, a VCG-type protocol is not false-name-proof, i.e., it is vulnerable against manipulations using multiple identifiers. Next, we show that any strategy-proof protocol in this model can be represented as a framework called Price-Oriented Rationing-Free (PORF) protocol, in which for each bidder, for each bundle of items, and for each quality, the payment for the bidder is determined independently of his own declaration, and the bidder can obtain a bundle that maximizes his utility independently of the allocations of other bidders. We develop a false-name-proof protocol in this model.
Bibliographie:SourceType-Conference Papers & Proceedings-1
ObjectType-Conference Paper-1
content type line 25
ISBN:9781581138641
1581138644
DOI:10.5555/1018409.1018744