Recovering short secret keys of RLCE in polynomial time
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| Titel: | Recovering short secret keys of RLCE in polynomial time |
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| Autoren: | Couvreur, Alain, Lequesne, Matthieu, Tillich, Jean-Pierre |
| Verlagsinformationen: | 2018-05-29 |
| Publikationsart: | Electronic Resource |
| Abstract: | We present a key recovery attack against Y. Wang's Random Linear Code Encryption (RLCE) scheme recently submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. This attack recovers the secret key for all the short key parameters proposed by the author. |
| Index Begriffe: | Computer Science - Cryptography and Security, Computer Science - Information Theory, text |
| URL: | |
| Verfügbarkeit: | Open access content. Open access content |
| Other Numbers: | COO oai:arXiv.org:1805.11489 1106300465 |
| Originalquelle: | CORNELL UNIV From OAIster®, provided by the OCLC Cooperative. |
| Dokumentencode: | edsoai.on1106300465 |
| Datenbank: | OAIster |
Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science | Abstract: | We present a key recovery attack against Y. Wang's Random Linear Code Encryption (RLCE) scheme recently submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. This attack recovers the secret key for all the short key parameters proposed by the author. |
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