View in EDS

Эффективная структурная атака на криптосистему Мак­Элиса–Сидельникова // Effective structural attack on McEliece­Sidelnikov public­key cryptosystem

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: Эффективная структурная атака на криптосистему Мак­Элиса–Сидельникова // Effective structural attack on McEliece­Sidelnikov public­key cryptosystem
Authors: Chizhov, Ivan, orcid:0000-0001-9126-, Давлетшина, Александра, Конюхов, Сергей
Publisher Information: Zenodo
Publication Year: 2020
Collection: Zenodo
Subject Terms: McEliece–Sidelnikov public key cryptosystem, McEliece public key cryptosystems, Reed-Muller codes, post-quantum cryptography, code-based cryptosystems
Description: The authors propose an algorithm for recovering the secret key of the MсEliece–Sidelnikov cryptosystem in the general case: with u ∈ N copies of the Reed–Muller codes. Recovering the secret key of the McEliece–Sidelnikov cryptosystem is reduced to the problems of recovering the secret key of the McEliece cryptosystem based on the Reed–Muller codes. It is proved in the paper that the proposed attack is polynomial. A set of keys for which the algorithm is applicable is described. The set is called the set of weak keys. The authors believe that most of the keys are weak and show that it should be assumed that the ratio of the weak keys in the cryptosystem’s key space is close to one. Methods for calculating the number of the weak keys are described and computational experiments confirming it have been performed.
Document Type: text
Language: Russian
ISSN: 2307-8162
Relation: https://zenodo.org/records/14336092; oai:zenodo.org:14336092; https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14336092
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.14336092
Availability: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14336092
https://zenodo.org/records/14336092
Rights: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International ; cc-by-4.0 ; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
Accession Number: edsbas.7A002680
Database: BASE
Description
Abstract:The authors propose an algorithm for recovering the secret key of the MсEliece–Sidelnikov cryptosystem in the general case: with u ∈ N copies of the Reed–Muller codes. Recovering the secret key of the McEliece–Sidelnikov cryptosystem is reduced to the problems of recovering the secret key of the McEliece cryptosystem based on the Reed–Muller codes. It is proved in the paper that the proposed attack is polynomial. A set of keys for which the algorithm is applicable is described. The set is called the set of weak keys. The authors believe that most of the keys are weak and show that it should be assumed that the ratio of the weak keys in the cryptosystem’s key space is close to one. Methods for calculating the number of the weak keys are described and computational experiments confirming it have been performed.
ISSN:23078162
DOI:10.5281/zenodo.14336092