Power Consumption Analysis for Reverse Engineering Digital Modulation: A Novel Approach to Physical Layer Attacks on Communication Systems
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| Titel: | Power Consumption Analysis for Reverse Engineering Digital Modulation: A Novel Approach to Physical Layer Attacks on Communication Systems |
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| Autoren: | Pareja, Pablo, Nasser, Yehya, Masmoudi, Ahmed, Houcke, Sébastien |
| Weitere Verfasser: | IMT Atlantique (IMT Atlantique), Institut Mines-Télécom Paris (IMT), Equipe Algorithm Architecture Interactions (Lab-STICC_2AI), Laboratoire des sciences et techniques de l'information, de la communication et de la connaissance (Lab-STICC), École Nationale d'Ingénieurs de Brest (ENIB), Université de Brest (UBO EPE)-Institut National Polytechnique de Bretagne (Bretagne INP)-Université de Brest (UBO EPE)-Institut National Polytechnique de Bretagne (Bretagne INP)-Université de Bretagne Sud (UBS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-IMT Atlantique (IMT Atlantique), Institut Mines-Télécom Paris (IMT)-Institut Mines-Télécom Paris (IMT)-École Nationale Supérieure de Techniques Avancées (ENSTA), Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris)-Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris)-École Nationale d'Ingénieurs de Brest (ENIB), Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris)-Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris), Département Mathematical and Electrical Engineering (IMT Atlantique - MEE), Institut Mines-Télécom Paris (IMT)-Institut Mines-Télécom Paris (IMT), Université de Brest (UBO EPE)-Institut National Polytechnique de Bretagne (Bretagne INP)-Université de Brest (UBO EPE)-Institut National Polytechnique de Bretagne (Bretagne INP)-Université de Bretagne Sud (UBS)-École Nationale Supérieure de Techniques Avancées Bretagne (ENSTA Bretagne)-Institut Mines-Télécom Paris (IMT)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Bretagne Loire (UBL)-IMT Atlantique (IMT Atlantique), Equipe Security, Intelligence and Integrity of Information (Lab-STICC_SI3) |
| Quelle: | Springer Communications in Computer and Information Science (CCIS) ; European Interdisciplinary Cybersecurity Conference ; https://imt-atlantique.hal.science/hal-04983776 ; European Interdisciplinary Cybersecurity Conference, Jun 2025, Rennes, France |
| Verlagsinformationen: | CCSD |
| Publikationsjahr: | 2025 |
| Bestand: | Université de Bretagne Occidentale: HAL |
| Schlagwörter: | Physical Layer Security, Side-channel attack (SCA) Power Consumption Analysis Digital Modulations Automatic Modulation Classification (AMC) Machine Learning Boosted Trees Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) HDL Physical Layer Security, HDL, Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), Boosted Trees, Machine Learning, Automatic Modulation Classification (AMC), Digital Modulations, Power Consumption Analysis, Side-channel attack (SCA), [INFO.INFO-CR]Computer Science [cs]/Cryptography and Security [cs.CR], [INFO.INFO-LG]Computer Science [cs]/Machine Learning [cs.LG], [SPI.TRON]Engineering Sciences [physics]/Electronics |
| Geographisches Schlagwort: | Rennes, France |
| Beschreibung: | International audience ; Physical layer security is a critical aspect of embedded wireless communication devices, particularly in military, civil, intelligence, and security applications. Ensuring secure communication at this layer is essential to prevent unauthorized access and exploitation of vulnerabilities. While many existing techniques focus on the transmitted signal, they often overlook potential side-channel vulnerabilities that arise when an attacker gains access to the device itself. In this work, we propose a novel approach to enhancing physical layer security by demonstrating the feasibility of differentiating modulation schemes through power consumption analysis (PCA). Using a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), we implemented various modulation schemes and measured the associated power consumption traces. Based on these measurements, we developed a classification algorithm using the gradient-boosted decision tree method. Our approach achieved a classification accuracy of approximately 99%, highlighting the potential of power analysis as both a tool for identifying vulnerabilities and strengthening security in embedded wireless communication devices. |
| Publikationsart: | conference object |
| Sprache: | English |
| Verfügbarkeit: | https://imt-atlantique.hal.science/hal-04983776 https://imt-atlantique.hal.science/hal-04983776v1/document https://imt-atlantique.hal.science/hal-04983776v1/file/Springer_Submission_L1SeC.pdf |
| Rights: | info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess |
| Dokumentencode: | edsbas.72DB62B7 |
| Datenbank: | BASE |
Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science | Abstract: | International audience ; Physical layer security is a critical aspect of embedded wireless communication devices, particularly in military, civil, intelligence, and security applications. Ensuring secure communication at this layer is essential to prevent unauthorized access and exploitation of vulnerabilities. While many existing techniques focus on the transmitted signal, they often overlook potential side-channel vulnerabilities that arise when an attacker gains access to the device itself. In this work, we propose a novel approach to enhancing physical layer security by demonstrating the feasibility of differentiating modulation schemes through power consumption analysis (PCA). Using a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), we implemented various modulation schemes and measured the associated power consumption traces. Based on these measurements, we developed a classification algorithm using the gradient-boosted decision tree method. Our approach achieved a classification accuracy of approximately 99%, highlighting the potential of power analysis as both a tool for identifying vulnerabilities and strengthening security in embedded wireless communication devices. |
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