Thomas Aquinas and Philosophy as a Way of Life

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Titel: Thomas Aquinas and Philosophy as a Way of Life
Autoren: John Marenbon
Weitere Verfasser: Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository
Quelle: New Blackfriars. :1-14
Verlagsinformationen: Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2025.
Publikationsjahr: 2025
Schlagwörter: Aristotle, contemplation, Philosophy as a way of life, Dominicans, Aquinas
Beschreibung: For Pierre Hadot, inventor of ‘Philosophy as a Way of Life’ (PWL), scholasticism, of which Aquinas is usually seen as the arch-representative, was not only the opposite of PWL but the agent of its destruction. I argue that Hadot’s view of Aquinas results from confusing ‘philosophy’ in the broad sense, which is how it needs to be understood in relation to PWL, with ‘philosophy’ in the narrower sense that it had for Aquinas himself. When Aquinas’s life and work is examined with this distinction in mind, he is seen to be as much an exponent of PWL as the medieval and modern thinkers (Boethius of Dacia, Dante, Montaigne, Kant, Nietzsche) usually cited by Hadot and his followers. This conclusion puts into doubt the historical narrative proposed by exponents of PWL. But some of Hadot’s own remarks leave room for a restricted version of PWL, stripped of its historical narrative and suggestions about the content of a philosophical life. This pure methodological Philosophy as a Way of Life, MPWL, does not make the unsustainable claims of PWL and helps to show how analytical, historical and more broadly philosophical approaches to Aquinas can be brought together.
Publikationsart: Article
Dateibeschreibung: application/pdf; text/xml
Sprache: English
ISSN: 1741-2005
0028-4289
DOI: 10.1017/nbf.2025.10107
DOI: 10.17863/cam.120808
Rights: CC BY
Dokumentencode: edsair.doi.dedup.....c5db632b9eab09043be8ef970b646a8f
Datenbank: OpenAIRE
Beschreibung
Abstract:For Pierre Hadot, inventor of ‘Philosophy as a Way of Life’ (PWL), scholasticism, of which Aquinas is usually seen as the arch-representative, was not only the opposite of PWL but the agent of its destruction. I argue that Hadot’s view of Aquinas results from confusing ‘philosophy’ in the broad sense, which is how it needs to be understood in relation to PWL, with ‘philosophy’ in the narrower sense that it had for Aquinas himself. When Aquinas’s life and work is examined with this distinction in mind, he is seen to be as much an exponent of PWL as the medieval and modern thinkers (Boethius of Dacia, Dante, Montaigne, Kant, Nietzsche) usually cited by Hadot and his followers. This conclusion puts into doubt the historical narrative proposed by exponents of PWL. But some of Hadot’s own remarks leave room for a restricted version of PWL, stripped of its historical narrative and suggestions about the content of a philosophical life. This pure methodological Philosophy as a Way of Life, MPWL, does not make the unsustainable claims of PWL and helps to show how analytical, historical and more broadly philosophical approaches to Aquinas can be brought together.
ISSN:17412005
00284289
DOI:10.1017/nbf.2025.10107