Thomas Aquinas and Philosophy as a Way of Life
Uložené v:
| Názov: | Thomas Aquinas and Philosophy as a Way of Life |
|---|---|
| Autori: | John Marenbon |
| Prispievatelia: | Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository |
| Zdroj: | New Blackfriars. :1-14 |
| Informácie o vydavateľovi: | Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2025. |
| Rok vydania: | 2025 |
| Predmety: | Aristotle, contemplation, Philosophy as a way of life, Dominicans, Aquinas |
| Popis: | For Pierre Hadot, inventor of ‘Philosophy as a Way of Life’ (PWL), scholasticism, of which Aquinas is usually seen as the arch-representative, was not only the opposite of PWL but the agent of its destruction. I argue that Hadot’s view of Aquinas results from confusing ‘philosophy’ in the broad sense, which is how it needs to be understood in relation to PWL, with ‘philosophy’ in the narrower sense that it had for Aquinas himself. When Aquinas’s life and work is examined with this distinction in mind, he is seen to be as much an exponent of PWL as the medieval and modern thinkers (Boethius of Dacia, Dante, Montaigne, Kant, Nietzsche) usually cited by Hadot and his followers. This conclusion puts into doubt the historical narrative proposed by exponents of PWL. But some of Hadot’s own remarks leave room for a restricted version of PWL, stripped of its historical narrative and suggestions about the content of a philosophical life. This pure methodological Philosophy as a Way of Life, MPWL, does not make the unsustainable claims of PWL and helps to show how analytical, historical and more broadly philosophical approaches to Aquinas can be brought together. |
| Druh dokumentu: | Article |
| Popis súboru: | application/pdf; text/xml |
| Jazyk: | English |
| ISSN: | 1741-2005 0028-4289 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/nbf.2025.10107 |
| DOI: | 10.17863/cam.120808 |
| Rights: | CC BY |
| Prístupové číslo: | edsair.doi.dedup.....c5db632b9eab09043be8ef970b646a8f |
| Databáza: | OpenAIRE |
| Abstrakt: | For Pierre Hadot, inventor of ‘Philosophy as a Way of Life’ (PWL), scholasticism, of which Aquinas is usually seen as the arch-representative, was not only the opposite of PWL but the agent of its destruction. I argue that Hadot’s view of Aquinas results from confusing ‘philosophy’ in the broad sense, which is how it needs to be understood in relation to PWL, with ‘philosophy’ in the narrower sense that it had for Aquinas himself. When Aquinas’s life and work is examined with this distinction in mind, he is seen to be as much an exponent of PWL as the medieval and modern thinkers (Boethius of Dacia, Dante, Montaigne, Kant, Nietzsche) usually cited by Hadot and his followers. This conclusion puts into doubt the historical narrative proposed by exponents of PWL. But some of Hadot’s own remarks leave room for a restricted version of PWL, stripped of its historical narrative and suggestions about the content of a philosophical life. This pure methodological Philosophy as a Way of Life, MPWL, does not make the unsustainable claims of PWL and helps to show how analytical, historical and more broadly philosophical approaches to Aquinas can be brought together. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 17412005 00284289 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/nbf.2025.10107 |
Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science