Preferences: What We Can and Can’t Do with Them

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Bibliographic Details
Title: Preferences: What We Can and Can’t Do with Them
Authors: Thoma, Johanna
Source: Philosophia. 52:1269-1278
Publisher Information: Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2024.
Publication Year: 2024
Subject Terms: Diachronic rationality, Preferences, 05 social sciences, Practical rationality, Instrumental rationality, 06 humanities and the arts, 0603 philosophy, ethics and religion, Dynamic choice, 0506 political science
Description: In her Choosing Well, Chrisoula Andreou puts forth an account of instrumental rationality that is revisionary in two respects. First, it changes the goalpost or standard of instrumental rationality to include “categorial” appraisal responses, alongside preferences, which are relational. Second, her account is explicitly diachronic, applying to series of choices as well as isolated ones. Andreou takes both revisions to be necessary for dealing with problematic choice scenarios agents with disorderly preferences might find themselves in. Focusing on problem cases involving cyclical preferences, I will first argue that her first revision is undermotivated once we accept the second. If we are willing to grant that there are diachronic rationality constraints, the preference-based picture can get us further than Andreou acknowledges. I will then turn to present additional grounds for rejecting the preference-based picture. However, these grounds also seem to undermine Andreou’s own appeal to categorial appraisal responses.
Document Type: Article
Language: English
ISSN: 1574-9274
0048-3893
DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00794-6
DOI: 10.15495/epub_ubt_00008275
Rights: CC BY
Accession Number: edsair.doi.dedup.....af3f30d962c67a8b97bb46cf7efcd7cb
Database: OpenAIRE
Description
Abstract:In her Choosing Well, Chrisoula Andreou puts forth an account of instrumental rationality that is revisionary in two respects. First, it changes the goalpost or standard of instrumental rationality to include “categorial” appraisal responses, alongside preferences, which are relational. Second, her account is explicitly diachronic, applying to series of choices as well as isolated ones. Andreou takes both revisions to be necessary for dealing with problematic choice scenarios agents with disorderly preferences might find themselves in. Focusing on problem cases involving cyclical preferences, I will first argue that her first revision is undermotivated once we accept the second. If we are willing to grant that there are diachronic rationality constraints, the preference-based picture can get us further than Andreou acknowledges. I will then turn to present additional grounds for rejecting the preference-based picture. However, these grounds also seem to undermine Andreou’s own appeal to categorial appraisal responses.
ISSN:15749274
00483893
DOI:10.1007/s11406-024-00794-6