Kolmogorov's Calculus of Problems and its Legacy

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Bibliographic Details
Title: Kolmogorov's Calculus of Problems and its Legacy
Authors: Andrei Rodin
Source: History and Philosophy of Logic. :1-38
Publication Status: Preprint
Publisher Information: Informa UK Limited, 2025.
Publication Year: 2025
Subject Terms: Mathematics - History and Overview, History and Overview (math.HO), FOS: Mathematics, 01A60, Mathematics - Logic, Logic (math.LO)
Description: Kolmogorov's Calculus of Problems is an interpretation of Heyting's intuitionistic propositional calculus published by A.N. Kolmogorov in 1932. Unlike Heyting's intended interpretation of this calculus, Kolmogorov's interpretation does not comply with the philosophical principles of Mathematical Intuitionism. This philosophical difference between Kolmogorov and Heyting implies different treatments of problems and propositions: while in Heyting's view the difference between problems and propositions is merely linguistic, Kolmogorov keeps the two concepts apart and does not apply his calculus to propositions. I stress differences between Kolmogorov's and Heyting's interpretations and show how the two interpretations diverged during their development. In this context I reconstruct Kolmogorov's philosophical views on mathematics and analyse his original take on the Hilbert-Brouwer controversy. Finally, I overview some later works motivated by Kolmogorov's Calculus of Problems and propose a justification of Kolmogorov's distinction between problems and propositions in terms of Univalent Mathematics.
66 pages including Appendix
Document Type: Article
Language: English
ISSN: 1464-5149
0144-5340
DOI: 10.1080/01445340.2025.2499409
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2307.09202
Access URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.09202
Rights: CC BY
Accession Number: edsair.doi.dedup.....9b43f65c2292dbecebf57d3fa7a148a2
Database: OpenAIRE
Description
Abstract:Kolmogorov's Calculus of Problems is an interpretation of Heyting's intuitionistic propositional calculus published by A.N. Kolmogorov in 1932. Unlike Heyting's intended interpretation of this calculus, Kolmogorov's interpretation does not comply with the philosophical principles of Mathematical Intuitionism. This philosophical difference between Kolmogorov and Heyting implies different treatments of problems and propositions: while in Heyting's view the difference between problems and propositions is merely linguistic, Kolmogorov keeps the two concepts apart and does not apply his calculus to propositions. I stress differences between Kolmogorov's and Heyting's interpretations and show how the two interpretations diverged during their development. In this context I reconstruct Kolmogorov's philosophical views on mathematics and analyse his original take on the Hilbert-Brouwer controversy. Finally, I overview some later works motivated by Kolmogorov's Calculus of Problems and propose a justification of Kolmogorov's distinction between problems and propositions in terms of Univalent Mathematics.<br />66 pages including Appendix
ISSN:14645149
01445340
DOI:10.1080/01445340.2025.2499409