Doxastic dilemmas and epistemic blame
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| Názov: | Doxastic dilemmas and epistemic blame |
|---|---|
| Autori: | Schmidt, Sebastian |
| Prispievatelia: | University of Zurich, Schmidt, Sebastian |
| Zdroj: | Philosophical Issues. 34:132-149 |
| Informácie o vydavateľovi: | Wiley, 2024. |
| Rok vydania: | 2024 |
| Predmety: | 100 Philosophy, epistemic relationships, evidence, epistemology, Epistemic norms, epistemic instrumentalism, 1211 Philosophy, normative epistemology, 10092 Institute of Philosophy, belief, epistemic blame |
| Popis: | What should we believe when epistemic and practical reasons pull in opposite directions? The traditional view states that there is something that we ought epistemically to believe and something that we ought practically to (cause ourselves to) believe, period. More recent accounts challenge this view, either by arguing that there is something that we ought simpliciter to believe, all epistemic and practical reasons considered (the weighing view), or by denying the normativity of epistemic reasons altogether (epistemic anti‐normativism). I argue against both accounts and defend the traditional view. An agent can be blameworthy in doxastic dilemmas for complying with their practical but not their epistemic reasons. This reveals how epistemic reasons are normative: the concept of epistemic blame helps us track epistemic normativity. |
| Druh dokumentu: | Article Other literature type |
| Popis súboru: | ZORA_SCHDDA_20.pdf - application/pdf |
| Jazyk: | English |
| ISSN: | 1758-2237 1533-6077 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/phis.12279 |
| DOI: | 10.5167/uzh-263359 |
| Prístupová URL adresa: | https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/263359/ https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-263359 |
| Rights: | CC BY |
| Prístupové číslo: | edsair.doi.dedup.....30b14a9a1645d35695aa2278c1c40fa0 |
| Databáza: | OpenAIRE |
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Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science | Abstrakt: | What should we believe when epistemic and practical reasons pull in opposite directions? The traditional view states that there is something that we ought epistemically to believe and something that we ought practically to (cause ourselves to) believe, period. More recent accounts challenge this view, either by arguing that there is something that we ought simpliciter to believe, all epistemic and practical reasons considered (the weighing view), or by denying the normativity of epistemic reasons altogether (epistemic anti‐normativism). I argue against both accounts and defend the traditional view. An agent can be blameworthy in doxastic dilemmas for complying with their practical but not their epistemic reasons. This reveals how epistemic reasons are normative: the concept of epistemic blame helps us track epistemic normativity. |
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| ISSN: | 17582237 15336077 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/phis.12279 |