Attacking Pairing-Free Attribute-Based Encryption Schemes
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| Titel: | Attacking Pairing-Free Attribute-Based Encryption Schemes |
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| Autoren: | Herranz Sotoca, Javier |
| Weitere Verfasser: | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. MAK - Matemàtica Aplicada a la Criptografia |
| Quelle: | UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) IEEE Access, Vol 8, Pp 222226-222232 (2020) |
| Verlagsinformationen: | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2020. |
| Publikationsjahr: | 2020 |
| Schlagwörter: | Seguretat informàtica, Attacks, TK1-9971, attribute-based encryption, Protecció de dades, attacks, Computer security, Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica::Seguretat informàtica::Criptografia, Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering, Criptografia -- Informàtica, data security, Data encryption (Computer science), Informàtica::Seguretat informàtica::Criptografia [Àrees temàtiques de la UPC], Data protection, cryptographic protocols |
| Beschreibung: | Combining several results that have been published in the last years, it is known that it is impossible to design simple and secure attribute-based encryption schemes that work in (classical) settings like the RSA or the pairing-free discrete logarithm ones. The purpose of this article is to broadcast this message through a wide (maybe non-cryptographic) audience, specially now that attribute-based encryption is considered as a useful tool to secure real systems like the Internet of Things. Today, only attribute-based encryption schemes that employ tools like bilinear pairings or lattices can provide some real (and provable) level of security. As an example of the fact that this message is still unknown for many people, we revisit a (maybe non exhaustive) list of articles proposing such insecure attribute-based encryption schemes: we recall which of these schemes have already been attacked and we describe attacks for the other ones. |
| Publikationsart: | Article |
| Dateibeschreibung: | application/pdf |
| ISSN: | 2169-3536 |
| DOI: | 10.1109/access.2020.3044143 |
| DOI: | 10.13039/501100011033 |
| Zugangs-URL: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ielx7/6287639/6514899/09291064.pdf https://doaj.org/article/87a36f574ed24f7cb460c89e1e6a0935 https://upcommons.upc.edu/bitstream/2117/335791/1/09291064_herranz.pdf https://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/journals/access/access8.html#Herranz20 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9291064 https://upcommons.upc.edu/handle/2117/335791 |
| Rights: | CC BY |
| Dokumentencode: | edsair.doi.dedup.....0df75e2a3e41108005da1d20a3cb7ee3 |
| Datenbank: | OpenAIRE |
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Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science | Abstract: | Combining several results that have been published in the last years, it is known that it is impossible to design simple and secure attribute-based encryption schemes that work in (classical) settings like the RSA or the pairing-free discrete logarithm ones. The purpose of this article is to broadcast this message through a wide (maybe non-cryptographic) audience, specially now that attribute-based encryption is considered as a useful tool to secure real systems like the Internet of Things. Today, only attribute-based encryption schemes that employ tools like bilinear pairings or lattices can provide some real (and provable) level of security. As an example of the fact that this message is still unknown for many people, we revisit a (maybe non exhaustive) list of articles proposing such insecure attribute-based encryption schemes: we recall which of these schemes have already been attacked and we describe attacks for the other ones. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 21693536 |
| DOI: | 10.1109/access.2020.3044143 |