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Epistemic Blame and Epistemic Business

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Názov: Epistemic Blame and Epistemic Business
Autori: Cunningham, Alexandra
Prispievatelia: Fantl, Jeremy, Haji, Ishtiyaque, Delehanty, Megan, PRISM
Informácie o vydavateľovi: 2022.
Rok vydania: 2022
Predmety: Ethics, Social epistemology, Standing to blame, Epistemology, Business condition, Epistemic blame
Popis: This thesis concerns our standing to epistemically blame. We have reason to think three claims hold true: (1) we only have the standing to epistemically blame when it’s our epistemic business, (2) other people’s epistemic errors are rarely our epistemic business, and (3) we often have the standing to epistemically blame. These jointly inconsistent claims generate the puzzle which motivates this thesis. I begin in Chapter II by offering a novel account of epistemic blame. Chapters III and IV represent my argument against the second of the above claims. I argue for two standing conditions on epistemic blame in order to demonstrate that others’ epistemic errors are often our epistemic business. Finally, in Chapter V, I examine a distinctly epistemic conception of hypocrisy to clarify one way in which we can lose the standing to epistemically blame. In sum, this thesis is meant to explain and defend our entitlement to epistemically blame.
Druh dokumentu: Master thesis
Popis súboru: application/pdf
Jazyk: English
Prístupová URL adresa: https://hdl.handle.net/1880/114592
Prístupové číslo: edsair.dedup.wf.002..11a2c3549c5d8b02b3b25db109f5ddf2
Databáza: OpenAIRE
Popis
Abstrakt:This thesis concerns our standing to epistemically blame. We have reason to think three claims hold true: (1) we only have the standing to epistemically blame when it’s our epistemic business, (2) other people’s epistemic errors are rarely our epistemic business, and (3) we often have the standing to epistemically blame. These jointly inconsistent claims generate the puzzle which motivates this thesis. I begin in Chapter II by offering a novel account of epistemic blame. Chapters III and IV represent my argument against the second of the above claims. I argue for two standing conditions on epistemic blame in order to demonstrate that others’ epistemic errors are often our epistemic business. Finally, in Chapter V, I examine a distinctly epistemic conception of hypocrisy to clarify one way in which we can lose the standing to epistemically blame. In sum, this thesis is meant to explain and defend our entitlement to epistemically blame.