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Epistemic Blame and Epistemic Business

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Titel: Epistemic Blame and Epistemic Business
Autoren: Cunningham, Alexandra
Weitere Verfasser: Fantl, Jeremy, Haji, Ishtiyaque, Delehanty, Megan, PRISM
Verlagsinformationen: 2022.
Publikationsjahr: 2022
Schlagwörter: Ethics, Social epistemology, Standing to blame, Epistemology, Business condition, Epistemic blame
Beschreibung: This thesis concerns our standing to epistemically blame. We have reason to think three claims hold true: (1) we only have the standing to epistemically blame when it’s our epistemic business, (2) other people’s epistemic errors are rarely our epistemic business, and (3) we often have the standing to epistemically blame. These jointly inconsistent claims generate the puzzle which motivates this thesis. I begin in Chapter II by offering a novel account of epistemic blame. Chapters III and IV represent my argument against the second of the above claims. I argue for two standing conditions on epistemic blame in order to demonstrate that others’ epistemic errors are often our epistemic business. Finally, in Chapter V, I examine a distinctly epistemic conception of hypocrisy to clarify one way in which we can lose the standing to epistemically blame. In sum, this thesis is meant to explain and defend our entitlement to epistemically blame.
Publikationsart: Master thesis
Dateibeschreibung: application/pdf
Sprache: English
Zugangs-URL: https://hdl.handle.net/1880/114592
Dokumentencode: edsair.dedup.wf.002..11a2c3549c5d8b02b3b25db109f5ddf2
Datenbank: OpenAIRE
Beschreibung
Abstract:This thesis concerns our standing to epistemically blame. We have reason to think three claims hold true: (1) we only have the standing to epistemically blame when it’s our epistemic business, (2) other people’s epistemic errors are rarely our epistemic business, and (3) we often have the standing to epistemically blame. These jointly inconsistent claims generate the puzzle which motivates this thesis. I begin in Chapter II by offering a novel account of epistemic blame. Chapters III and IV represent my argument against the second of the above claims. I argue for two standing conditions on epistemic blame in order to demonstrate that others’ epistemic errors are often our epistemic business. Finally, in Chapter V, I examine a distinctly epistemic conception of hypocrisy to clarify one way in which we can lose the standing to epistemically blame. In sum, this thesis is meant to explain and defend our entitlement to epistemically blame.