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Fake Authority Country: Epistemic Responsibility and the Normativity of Expertise.

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Titel: Fake Authority Country: Epistemic Responsibility and the Normativity of Expertise.
Autoren: Watson, Jamie Carlin
Quelle: Social Epistemology; Nov2025, Vol. 39 Issue 6, p597-611, 15p
Schlagwörter: EXPERTISE, EXPERT evidence, LAYPERSONS, FAIRNESS, CONTEXTUALISM (Philosophy), TRUST
Abstract: The normative force of expert authority is typically analyzed from the perspective of those who primarily seek experts, namely, non-experts. When a non-expert has good reasons to believe someone is an expert in a domain, they should regard the expert as authoritative in that domain, and that is just what is meant by 'expert authority'. I call these accounts 'standpoint-dependent' accounts of authority. Unfortunately, non-experts may have good reasons to ascribe authority in cases where experts act irresponsibly in their domains and where the non-expert is in no position to discern that irresponsibility. This raises the question: When responsible experts disagree with irresponsible experts but non-experts cannot tell difference, do responsible experts retain any sense of normative epistemic authority? I argue that the answer is yes and expand current accounts of expert authority to include a 'standpoint-independent' dimension, which is a normative feature of expert testimony that encompasses more than the expert's superior epistemic position and that is not restricted to non-experts' perception of responsible expert behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Abstract:The normative force of expert authority is typically analyzed from the perspective of those who primarily seek experts, namely, non-experts. When a non-expert has good reasons to believe someone is an expert in a domain, they should regard the expert as authoritative in that domain, and that is just what is meant by 'expert authority'. I call these accounts 'standpoint-dependent' accounts of authority. Unfortunately, non-experts may have good reasons to ascribe authority in cases where experts act irresponsibly in their domains and where the non-expert is in no position to discern that irresponsibility. This raises the question: When responsible experts disagree with irresponsible experts but non-experts cannot tell difference, do responsible experts retain any sense of normative epistemic authority? I argue that the answer is yes and expand current accounts of expert authority to include a 'standpoint-independent' dimension, which is a normative feature of expert testimony that encompasses more than the expert's superior epistemic position and that is not restricted to non-experts' perception of responsible expert behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:02691728
DOI:10.1080/02691728.2025.2453936