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| Názov: |
Try, Try Again: Repeat Veto Threats in Presidential-Congressional Bargaining. |
| Autori: |
Lewallen, Jonathan |
| Zdroj: |
Congress & the Presidency; Jan-Apr2025, Vol. 52 Issue 1, p1-22, 22p |
| Predmety: |
PUBLIC opinion, PUBLIC spending, LEGISLATIVE bills, VETO, PRESIDENTS |
| Abstrakt: |
Presidents use veto threats to bargain over legislation with Congress. While presidents may fail if Congress passes legislation over their veto threat, they also lose some power if they must repeatedly "go public" in bargaining over one bill. This article examines "repeat" veto threats: multiple veto threats issued to the same bill. Using data on all veto threats issued from 1985 through 2022, I find that presidents issue fewer repeat veto threats during unified government and when majority control of the two congressional chambers is divided. Presidents with higher approval ratings also tend to issue more repeat veto threats. Presidents avoid repeatedly "going public" when they can but more popular presidents do so if they must. I also find evidence of more repeat veto threats on spending bills, which suggests that presidential bargaining and "going public" operate differently across the authorization and appropriations processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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