Bibliographische Detailangaben
| Titel: |
微架构安全漏洞攻击技术综述. (Chinese) |
| Alternate Title: |
Survey of Attack Techniques for Microarchitecture Security Vulnerabilities. (English) |
| Autoren: |
王泉成, 唐 明 |
| Quelle: |
Journal of Cryptologic Research (2097-4116); Dec2024, Vol. 11 Issue 6, p1199-1232, 34p |
| Abstract (English): |
As researchers discover more and more microarchitectural designs that are potential sources of information leakage, the study of related attack and defense techniques has also become a hot research topic in academia and industry. Therefore, this study systematically summarizes the attack techniques of microarchitecture security vulnerabilities that have been identified by researchers from the perspective of processor microarchitecture design, including timing side-channel attacks, transient execution attacks, and covert-channel attacks. Based on this classification, the attack types, corresponding vulnerabilities, attack principles, and vulnerable security mechanisms of each class of microarchitecture attacks are analyzed and summarized in detail. Then, a directed acyclic graph (DAG) model is proposed to analyze the vulnerability of processor microarchitecture based on the microarchitectural vulnerabilities and attack principles exploited by microarchitecture attacks. In this model, the operations in the attack flow is combined with the shared microarchitectural resources of the processor microarchitecture and this method is used to model each class of microarchitecture attacks, which can provide a better understanding of the root cause and attack principle of microarchitecture attacks. In addition, the potential applications of the proposed DAG analysis model is investigated from vulnerability validation and defense analysis perspectives. A new microarchitecture attack is also found and a cache timing side-channel defense strategy is introduced based on the proposed model. Finally, this study discusses future research directions and trends in the field of processor security from both attack and defense perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Abstract (Chinese): |
随着研究人员发现越来越多存在信息泄漏的微架构优化设计, 相关攻击技术与防御技术的研究 也成为学术界和工业界研究的热点. 本文从处理器微架构设计的角度出发, 按照时间侧信道攻击、暂态攻 击和隐蔽信道攻击的分类模式, 系统性地归纳研究人员已经发现的微架构安全漏洞的攻击技术, 包括攻击 分类、对应漏洞、攻击原理、受威胁的安全机制. 然后, 基于微架构攻击利用的微架构漏洞以及攻击原理, 提出了一种用于分析处理器微架构的脆弱性的有向无环图模型. 该模型将攻击流程中的操作与处理器微 架构的共享资源相结合, 并且对每类微架构攻击分别建模, 从而可以更好地理解微架构攻击的根本原因和 攻击原理. 此外, 还从漏洞验证、防护评估等多个角度分析了有向无环图模型的应用优势, 并提出一种新 型的微架构攻击与一种缓存时间侧信道防护策略. 最后, 从攻击和防御两个方向展望了处理器安全领域未 来的研究方向和发展趋势. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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Copyright of Journal of Cryptologic Research (2097-4116) is the property of Editorial Board of Journal of Cryptologic Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
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