Podrobná bibliografie
| Název: |
Information Aggregation via Contracting. |
| Autoři: |
LI, JIASUN |
| Zdroj: |
Journal of Finance (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.); Apr2023, Vol. 78 Issue 2, p935-965, 31p |
| Témata: |
ACCESS to information, CONTRACTS, PROFIT, INVESTORS, INVESTMENT risk, RATIONAL expectations (Economic theory), PRODUCTION (Economic theory), INVESTMENT policy, PRICES, BUSINESS revenue |
| Abstrakt: |
When a group of investors with dispersed private information jointly invest in a risky project, how should they divide the project's profit? We show that a simple contract dividing profits in proportion to investors' risk tolerances may facilitate information aggregation by altering investors' risk‐taking incentives when they decide on how investment strategies respond to private information. Our results provide a contracting‐based approach for information aggregation, which is an alternative to learning from endogenous market variables (e.g., prices) via contingent schedules as seen in well‐known rational expectations equilibrium models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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