Bibliographische Detailangaben
| Titel: |
On the subgame perfect implementabılıty of voting rules. |
| Autoren: |
Núñez, Matías, Sanver, M. Remzi |
| Quelle: |
Social Choice & Welfare; Feb2021, Vol. 56 Issue 2, p421-441, 21p |
| Schlagwörter: |
SOCIAL choice, VOTING, SOCIAL norms, SATISFACTION |
| Abstract: |
Abreu and Sen (J Econ Theory 50(2):285–299, 1990) provide a necessary condition, called Condition α , which is almost sufficient for a social choice rule to be implementable via subgame perfect equilibria. Yet, it is not straightforward to check the satisfaction of Condition α . We contribute in this direction by establishing a nuanced picture over the subgame perfect implementability of compromise rules, as a function of the compromise threshold. This contrasts with scoring rules that all fail to be subgame perfect implementable and with several Condorcet rules which are subgame perfect implementable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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