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Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance.

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Název: Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance.
Autoři: Yu, Byungjun, Zeng, Saixing, Chen, Hongquan, Meng, Xiaohua, Tam, Chiming
Zdroj: Business Strategy & the Environment (John Wiley & Sons, Inc); Jan2021, Vol. 30 Issue 1, p1-20, 20p, 5 Charts, 5 Graphs
Témata: ECONOMIC competition, FAMILY-owned business enterprises, ENVIRONMENTAL regulations, AGENCY costs, ENVIRONMENTAL management, DIVERSIFICATION in industry
Abstrakt: Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Databáze: Complementary Index
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Abstrakt:Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:09644733
DOI:10.1002/bse.2605