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What makes social abilities sophisticated? Not recursive mentalising.

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Titel: What makes social abilities sophisticated? Not recursive mentalising.
Autoren: Apperly IA; Centre for Developmental Science, School of Psychology, https://ror.org/03angcq70University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK i.a.apperly@bham.ac.uk https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/psychology/apperly-ian.
Quelle: The Behavioral and brain sciences [Behav Brain Sci] 2025 Nov 27; Vol. 48, pp. e164. Date of Electronic Publication: 2025 Nov 27.
Publikationsart: Journal Article
Sprache: English
Info zur Zeitschrift: Publisher: Cambridge Univ. Press Country of Publication: England NLM ID: 7808666 Publication Model: Electronic Cited Medium: Internet ISSN: 1469-1825 (Electronic) Linking ISSN: 0140525X NLM ISO Abbreviation: Behav Brain Sci Subsets: MEDLINE
Imprint Name(s): Original Publication: Cambridge [Eng.], New York, Cambridge Univ. Press.
MeSH-Schlagworte: Social Skills* , Mentalization*/physiology , Social Behavior* , Theory of Mind*/physiology, Humans
Abstract: To explain human social sophistication, and proximal phylogenetic steps leading to it, Dunbar claims that mentalising expands to increasingly high levels of recursion. However, the evidential basis for this claim is weak, exposing both a limitation in Dunbar's account and in the field's current understanding of social sophistication.
Entry Date(s): Date Created: 20251126 Date Completed: 20251126 Latest Revision: 20251126
Update Code: 20251127
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X25100526
PMID: 41298107
Datenbank: MEDLINE
Beschreibung
Abstract:To explain human social sophistication, and proximal phylogenetic steps leading to it, Dunbar claims that mentalising expands to increasingly high levels of recursion. However, the evidential basis for this claim is weak, exposing both a limitation in Dunbar's account and in the field's current understanding of social sophistication.
ISSN:1469-1825
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X25100526