Logical intuitions or matching heuristics? Examining the effect of deduction training on belief-based reasoning judgments.
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| Titel: | Logical intuitions or matching heuristics? Examining the effect of deduction training on belief-based reasoning judgments. |
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| Autoren: | Ghasemi O; School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, 2052, Australia. o.ghasemi@unsw.edu.au.; School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. o.ghasemi@unsw.edu.au., Handley SJ; School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia., Stephens RG; School of Psychology, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia. |
| Quelle: | Memory & cognition [Mem Cognit] 2025 Oct; Vol. 53 (7), pp. 2279-2300. Date of Electronic Publication: 2025 Apr 11. |
| Publikationsart: | Journal Article |
| Sprache: | English |
| Info zur Zeitschrift: | Publisher: Psychonomic Society Country of Publication: United States NLM ID: 0357443 Publication Model: Print-Electronic Cited Medium: Internet ISSN: 1532-5946 (Electronic) Linking ISSN: 0090502X NLM ISO Abbreviation: Mem Cognit Subsets: MEDLINE |
| Imprint Name(s): | Original Publication: Austin Tx Psychonomic Society |
| MeSH-Schlagworte: | Intuition*/physiology , Logic* , Heuristics*/physiology , Thinking*/physiology , Judgment*/physiology , Culture*, Humans ; Adult ; Young Adult ; Male ; Female |
| Abstract: | Competing Interests: Declarations. Ethics approval: Both experiments were approved by the Macquarie University Human Science Ethics Committee (Approval Number 26289) and the University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics Subcommittee (Approval Number 21/24). Consent to participate: Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to data collection. Consent for publication: All authors consent to the publication of this manuscript. Open science statement: All materials, analysis codes, and data (Ghasemi et al., 2022b) have been made publicly available at the Open Science Framework website and can be accessed at ( https://osf.io/r382w/ ). Conflicts of interest/Competing interests: The authors declare no conflicts of interest. When individuals are asked to evaluate the believability of the conclusions to valid or invalid arguments, they often endorse valid conclusions at higher rates than invalid ones. This effect of validity on belief judgments-the "logic-belief effect" -is considered evidence of intuitive logic. However, recent studies challenged this interpretation by demonstrating that "pseudo-logical" arguments interfere with belief judgments in the same way as valid logical structures do. This finding suggests that a simple heuristic that relies on the matching of constituent propositions, rather than sensitivity to logical validity per se, may lead to the logic-belief effect. To further test this matching heuristic account, across two experiments, we instructed participants to evaluate the conclusions of a series of logical and pseudo-logical arguments based on logic or belief, before and after a logic training block. The results showed that whilst both judgment types were impacted by both logical and pseudo-logical structures before training, after training the effect of the latter was indeed minimized in logic judgments but not belief judgments. The results largely support the matching heuristic account, which have important implications for contemporary dual-process theories of reasoning. (© 2025. The Author(s).) |
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| Contributed Indexing: | Keywords: Deductive reasoning; Dual process; Intuitive logic; Logic training; Matching heuristic; Nonexclusivity |
| Entry Date(s): | Date Created: 20250411 Date Completed: 20251105 Latest Revision: 20251108 |
| Update Code: | 20251108 |
| PubMed Central ID: | PMC12589337 |
| DOI: | 10.3758/s13421-025-01710-3 |
| PMID: | 40214711 |
| Datenbank: | MEDLINE |
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Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science | Abstract: | Competing Interests: Declarations. Ethics approval: Both experiments were approved by the Macquarie University Human Science Ethics Committee (Approval Number 26289) and the University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics Subcommittee (Approval Number 21/24). Consent to participate: Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to data collection. Consent for publication: All authors consent to the publication of this manuscript. Open science statement: All materials, analysis codes, and data (Ghasemi et al., 2022b) have been made publicly available at the Open Science Framework website and can be accessed at ( https://osf.io/r382w/ ). Conflicts of interest/Competing interests: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.<br />When individuals are asked to evaluate the believability of the conclusions to valid or invalid arguments, they often endorse valid conclusions at higher rates than invalid ones. This effect of validity on belief judgments-the "logic-belief effect" -is considered evidence of intuitive logic. However, recent studies challenged this interpretation by demonstrating that "pseudo-logical" arguments interfere with belief judgments in the same way as valid logical structures do. This finding suggests that a simple heuristic that relies on the matching of constituent propositions, rather than sensitivity to logical validity per se, may lead to the logic-belief effect. To further test this matching heuristic account, across two experiments, we instructed participants to evaluate the conclusions of a series of logical and pseudo-logical arguments based on logic or belief, before and after a logic training block. The results showed that whilst both judgment types were impacted by both logical and pseudo-logical structures before training, after training the effect of the latter was indeed minimized in logic judgments but not belief judgments. The results largely support the matching heuristic account, which have important implications for contemporary dual-process theories of reasoning.<br /> (© 2025. The Author(s).) |
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| ISSN: | 1532-5946 |
| DOI: | 10.3758/s13421-025-01710-3 |