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When Politics Is Not Pivotal: Supermajority Debate Rules in State Legislatures.

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Název: When Politics Is Not Pivotal: Supermajority Debate Rules in State Legislatures.
Autoři: Curry, James M.1 (AUTHOR) jcurry5@nd.edu, Oldham, Robert L.2 (AUTHOR) roldham@agnesscott.edu
Zdroj: Legislative Studies Quarterly. Nov2025, Vol. 50 Issue 4, p1-15. 15p.
Témata: *LEGISLATIVE bodies, *COALITIONS, VETO, CONSENSUS (Social sciences), LEGISLATIVE power, PARLIAMENTARY practice
Geografický termín: UNITED States
Abstrakt: The 60‐vote end‐debate threshold is a key institution in the United States Senate. Most winning coalitions require 60 votes, effectively giving veto power to a minority of senators. But do supermajority debate rules necessarily translate into minority veto power? We examine this in state legislatures, where there is far more variation in whether chamber rules require a majority or a supermajority of legislators to cut off debate. Across multiple analyses and data sources, we fail to find systematic evidence that supermajority debate rules are associated with several outcome variables, including the size of bill passage coalitions, news coverage of obstruction, and the success of major proposals. The lack of evidence indicates that, in many cases, debate rules do not translate into legislative "pivots" and that case‐specific knowledge is necessary for understanding the influence of legislative rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Abstrakt:The 60‐vote end‐debate threshold is a key institution in the United States Senate. Most winning coalitions require 60 votes, effectively giving veto power to a minority of senators. But do supermajority debate rules necessarily translate into minority veto power? We examine this in state legislatures, where there is far more variation in whether chamber rules require a majority or a supermajority of legislators to cut off debate. Across multiple analyses and data sources, we fail to find systematic evidence that supermajority debate rules are associated with several outcome variables, including the size of bill passage coalitions, news coverage of obstruction, and the success of major proposals. The lack of evidence indicates that, in many cases, debate rules do not translate into legislative "pivots" and that case‐specific knowledge is necessary for understanding the influence of legislative rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:03629805
DOI:10.1111/lsq.70035