Inflated Recommendations.

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Název: Inflated Recommendations.
Autoři: Peitz, Martin1,2 (AUTHOR) Martin.Peitz@gmail.com, Sobolev, Anton1 (AUTHOR)
Zdroj: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell). Nov2025, p1. 18p. 4 Illustrations.
Témata: *WELFARE economics, *RECOMMENDER systems, *MONOPOLIES, *CONSUMERS, STATISTICAL bias
Abstrakt: ABSTRACT Biased recommendations arise naturally in markets with heterogeneous consumers. We study a model in which a monopolist offers an experience good to a population of consumers with heterogeneous tastes and makes personalized purchase recommendations. We provide conditions under which a firm makes welfare‐reducing purchase recommendations with positive probability, resulting in inflated recommendations. We extend this insight to a setting in which an intermediary makes the recommendations, whereas a seller sets the retail price. Regulatory interventions that forbid inflated recommendations may lead to higher social welfare or may backfire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Databáze: Business Source Index
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Abstrakt:ABSTRACT Biased recommendations arise naturally in markets with heterogeneous consumers. We study a model in which a monopolist offers an experience good to a population of consumers with heterogeneous tastes and makes personalized purchase recommendations. We provide conditions under which a firm makes welfare‐reducing purchase recommendations with positive probability, resulting in inflated recommendations. We extend this insight to a setting in which an intermediary makes the recommendations, whereas a seller sets the retail price. Regulatory interventions that forbid inflated recommendations may lead to higher social welfare or may backfire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:07416261
DOI:10.1111/1756-2171.70036