Bibliographic Details
| Title: |
Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods. |
| Authors: |
Che, Yeon-Koo1 (AUTHOR), Zhong, Weijie2 (AUTHOR) |
| Source: |
Review of Economic Studies. Oct2025, Vol. 92 Issue 5, p2923-2951. 29p. |
| Subject Terms: |
*PRODUCT bundling, *DISTRIBUTION (Probability theory), *BUSINESS revenue, *GAME theory, *UNCERTAINTY (Information theory) |
| Abstract: |
We study robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes revenue against a worst-case distribution of a buyer's valuations within a set of distributions, called an "ambiguity" set. We identify the exact forms of robustly optimal selling mechanisms and the worst-case distributions when the ambiguity set satisfies various moment conditions on the values of subsets of goods. The analysis reveals general properties of the ambiguity set that justifies categorical bundling, which includes separate sales and pure bundling as special cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: |
Business Source Index |
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