Targeted Treatment Assignment Using Data from Randomized Experiments with Noncompliance.

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Titel: Targeted Treatment Assignment Using Data from Randomized Experiments with Noncompliance.
Autoren: Athey, Susan1 (AUTHOR) athey@stanford.edu, Inoue, Kosuke2 (AUTHOR) inoue.kosuke.2j@kyoto-u.ac.jp, Tsugawa, Yusuke3 (AUTHOR) ytsugawa@mednet.ucla.edu
Quelle: AEA Papers & Proceedings. May2025, Vol. 115, p209-214. 6p.
Schlagwörter: *NONCOMPLIANCE, *STATISTICAL decision making, TREATMENT effectiveness, CLINICAL trials, ASSIGNMENT problems (Programming)
Abstract: This paper considers randomized experiments with noncompliance where individuals in the treatment group become eligible for a treatment but some do not receive it. We study the estimation and evaluation of treatment assignment policies targeted to individuals on the basis of pretreatment characteristics. We consider a decision problem where the policy determines eligibility, which is costly, and compliance continues to be imperfect. Then optimal policies prioritize by a weighted average of the intent-to-treat effect of eligibility on outcomes and the treatment effect of eligibility on receiving the treatment. We illustrate the ideas using data from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Beschreibung
Abstract:This paper considers randomized experiments with noncompliance where individuals in the treatment group become eligible for a treatment but some do not receive it. We study the estimation and evaluation of treatment assignment policies targeted to individuals on the basis of pretreatment characteristics. We consider a decision problem where the policy determines eligibility, which is costly, and compliance continues to be imperfect. Then optimal policies prioritize by a weighted average of the intent-to-treat effect of eligibility on outcomes and the treatment effect of eligibility on receiving the treatment. We illustrate the ideas using data from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:25740768
DOI:10.1257/pandp.20251063