Bibliographische Detailangaben
| Titel: |
Governance by One-Lot Shares. |
| Autoren: |
Cao, Feng1 (AUTHOR), Xuan, Yuhai2 (AUTHOR) yuhai.xuan@uci.edu, Yuan, Rongli3 (AUTHOR), Zou, Hong4 (AUTHOR) |
| Quelle: |
Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis. Mar2025, Vol. 60 Issue 2, p874-909. 36p. |
| Schlagwörter: |
*MINORITY stockholders, *INDIVIDUAL investors, *INVESTOR protection, *NEW business enterprises, *MAJORITY stockholders, *MERGERS & acquisitions, ACTIVISM |
| Geografische Kategorien: |
CHINA |
| Abstract: |
We use a novel experiment in China to examine the effects of having a quasi-official investor own a small number of shares on specific firm outcomes. We find that, relative to control firms, pilot firms experience an increase in dissenting votes from independent directors, a reduction in tunneling and earnings management activities, and an improvement in merger performance. Independent directors questioned by the quasi-official shareholder in activism events subsequently lose board seats in the director market. Overall, our results shed light on a new mechanism for enhancing the protection of minority shareholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Datenbank: |
Business Source Index |
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