In EDS ansehen

The Power of Boilerplate: Bilateralism, Plurilateralism, and the International Tax System.

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Titel: The Power of Boilerplate: Bilateralism, Plurilateralism, and the International Tax System.
Autoren: Arel-Bundock, Vincent1 (AUTHOR) vincent.arel-bundock@umontreal.ca, Lechner, Lisa2 (AUTHOR) Lisa.Lechner@uibk.ac.at
Quelle: International Interactions. Jul/Aug2024, Vol. 50 Issue 4, p685-702. 18p.
Schlagwörter: *INTERNATIONAL competition, *INTERNATIONAL business enterprises, BILATERAL treaties, LEGAL language, STATE power
Abstract (English): How do states exercise power in complex, decentralized governance regimes? This article sheds light on this question by analyzing one of the pillars of the post-war economic order: the international tax regime. The taxation of multinational enterprises is governed by a system composed of thousands of Bilateral Tax Treaties signed between pairs of national governments. We argue that despite the bilateral nature of these treaties, their legal content is largely controlled by a small group of economically powerful governments. By drafting and promoting "boilerplate" legal language, and by leveraging network effects, OECD countries were able to build a coherent, encompassing, quasi-multilateral regime to govern the taxation of multinationals in most of the world. We test and find support for our arguments about the role of network effects and the power of boilerplate using inferential network analysis and an automated text analysis of a corpus of 3200 treaty texts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Abstract (Spanish): ¿Cómo ejercen el poder aquellos Estados que tienen regímenes de gobernanza complejos y descentralizados? Este artículo arroja luz sobre esta cuestión analizando uno de los pilares del orden económico de la posguerra: el régimen fiscal internacional. La tributación de las empresas multinacionales se rige por un sistema compuesto por miles de Tratados Fiscales Bilaterales (BTT, por sus siglas en inglés), los cuales son firmados entre pares de Gobiernos nacionales. Argumentamos que, a pesar de la naturaleza bilateral de los BTT, su contenido legal está controlado, en gran medida, por un pequeño grupo de Gobiernos económicamente poderosos. Los países de la OCDE lograron crear, mediante la redacción y promoción de un lenguaje jurídico "estándar" y el aprovechamiento de los efectos de redes, un régimen coherente, incluyente y cuasi multilateral con el que poder regir la tributación de las multinacionales en la mayor parte del mundo. Probamos y encontramos apoyo para nuestros argumentos en materia del papel de los efectos de las redes y del poder del lenguaje estándar mediante el uso del análisis inferencial de redes y un análisis de texto automatizado de un corpus de 3200 textos procedentes de tratados. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Abstract (French): Comment les États exercent-ils leur pouvoir dans des régimes de gouvernance complexes et décentralisés? Cet article tente d'éclaircir cette question en analysant l'un des piliers de l'ordre économique d'après-guerre : le régime fiscal international. La fiscalité des multinationales est régie par un système composé de milliers de conventions fiscales bilatérales (CFB) signées par deux gouvernements nationaux. Nous affirmons que malgré la nature bilatérale des CFB, leur contenu légal est largement régi par un petit groupe de gouvernements puissants sur le plan économique. En rédigeant et en promouvant un langage juridique type, et en exploitant les effets de réseau, les pays de l'OCDE ont pu construire un régime quasi multilatéral cohérent et inclusif pour régir la fiscalité des multinationales dans la majorité du monde. Nous testons et trouvons des éléments pour venir étayer nos arguments quant au rôle des effets de réseau et au pouvoir du langage type à l'aide d'une analyse de réseau par inférence et d'une analyse de texte automatique d'un corpus de 3 200 textes de traité. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of International Interactions is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Datenbank: Business Source Index
Beschreibung
Abstract:How do states exercise power in complex, decentralized governance regimes? This article sheds light on this question by analyzing one of the pillars of the post-war economic order: the international tax regime. The taxation of multinational enterprises is governed by a system composed of thousands of Bilateral Tax Treaties signed between pairs of national governments. We argue that despite the bilateral nature of these treaties, their legal content is largely controlled by a small group of economically powerful governments. By drafting and promoting "boilerplate" legal language, and by leveraging network effects, OECD countries were able to build a coherent, encompassing, quasi-multilateral regime to govern the taxation of multinationals in most of the world. We test and find support for our arguments about the role of network effects and the power of boilerplate using inferential network analysis and an automated text analysis of a corpus of 3200 treaty texts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:03050629
DOI:10.1080/03050629.2024.2359090