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Refereeing democracy: judiciary, parliament and executive in 50 years of Papua New Guinea politics.

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Názov:	Refereeing democracy: judiciary, parliament and executive in 50 years of Papua New Guinea politics.
Autori:	Kabuni, Michael¹ (AUTHOR) michael.kabuni@anu.edu.au
Zdroj:	Australian Journal of International Affairs. Nov2025, p1-18. 18p.
Predmety:	CONSTITUTIONAL law, LEGISLATIVE bodies, APPELLATE courts, EXECUTIVES, JUSTICE administration, POLITICAL systems
Geografický termín:	PAPUA New Guinea
Abstrakt:	Since independence in 1975, Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) Supreme Court has often been asked to rule on constitutional questions involving Parliament’s affairs despite the Constitutional provisions on separation of powers. At times, the Supreme Court has declared parliamentary matters non-justiciable and declined to intervene. In other cases, however, the Supreme Court has intervened, asserting that where constitutional requirements are violated or the rights of members of parliament are denied, judicial review is necessary. This paper examines these contrasting judicial approaches within the broader context of PNG’s volatile political environment. It argues that, given the Supreme Court’s pivotal role in mediating the relationship between the executive and legislative branches, a more coherent and principled doctrine of non-justiciability is essential – one that preserves the autonomy of Parliament while ensuring that constitutional norms and legislative accountability are not compromised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Databáza:	Academic Search Index

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Abstrakt:	Since independence in 1975, Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) Supreme Court has often been asked to rule on constitutional questions involving Parliament’s affairs despite the Constitutional provisions on separation of powers. At times, the Supreme Court has declared parliamentary matters non-justiciable and declined to intervene. In other cases, however, the Supreme Court has intervened, asserting that where constitutional requirements are violated or the rights of members of parliament are denied, judicial review is necessary. This paper examines these contrasting judicial approaches within the broader context of PNG’s volatile political environment. It argues that, given the Supreme Court’s pivotal role in mediating the relationship between the executive and legislative branches, a more coherent and principled doctrine of non-justiciability is essential – one that preserves the autonomy of Parliament while ensuring that constitutional norms and legislative accountability are not compromised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:	10357718
DOI:	10.1080/10357718.2025.2593390