Stumbling out of the Gates: Security Strategy and Military Weakness after Revolutionary Victory.
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| Title: | Stumbling out of the Gates: Security Strategy and Military Weakness after Revolutionary Victory. |
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| Authors: | Thaler, Kai M. (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Security Studies. Oct2025, p1-31. 31p. 1 Illustration. |
| Subject Terms: | *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *INTERNATIONAL security, *POLITICAL stability, *REVOLUTIONS, IRAN-United States relations |
| Geographic Terms: | NICARAGUA, IRAN |
| Abstract: | AbstractRevolutionary regimes may prove durable over time, yet they are often weak and militarily ineffective after victory. How do the circumstances of victory shape these weaknesses? Where old regime security forces persist, I argue that revolutionary regimes will focus on coup-proofing, creating vulnerabilities to insurgent or foreign threats. If old regime security forces disintegrate but rebel rivals remain, revolutionaries will likely focus on counterinsurgency, potentially neglecting external threats. Absent old regime forces and rebel rivals, revolutionaries will focus on external defense, neglecting possible domestic threats. I inductively develop this theory through case studies of Nicaragua, where old regime forces dissolved, and Iran, where they survived. Nicaragua’s externally focused revolutionary regime let insurgencies develop, while only invading Iraqi forces’ hesitancy saved Iran’s coup-proofing regime. This study reinforces the importance of security forces in revolutionary transitions and suggests that revolutionary regimes’ early, weak period is when international engagement could be most impactful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Database: | Academic Search Index |
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Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science | Abstract: | AbstractRevolutionary regimes may prove durable over time, yet they are often weak and militarily ineffective after victory. How do the circumstances of victory shape these weaknesses? Where old regime security forces persist, I argue that revolutionary regimes will focus on coup-proofing, creating vulnerabilities to insurgent or foreign threats. If old regime security forces disintegrate but rebel rivals remain, revolutionaries will likely focus on counterinsurgency, potentially neglecting external threats. Absent old regime forces and rebel rivals, revolutionaries will focus on external defense, neglecting possible domestic threats. I inductively develop this theory through case studies of Nicaragua, where old regime forces dissolved, and Iran, where they survived. Nicaragua’s externally focused revolutionary regime let insurgencies develop, while only invading Iraqi forces’ hesitancy saved Iran’s coup-proofing regime. This study reinforces the importance of security forces in revolutionary transitions and suggests that revolutionary regimes’ early, weak period is when international engagement could be most impactful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| ISSN: | 09636412 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/09636412.2025.2572637 |