Coherency-Based Detection Algorithm for Synchrophasor Cyberattacks

The wide area monitoring system (WAMS) is critical for power system situational awareness, but represents a growing cybersecurity vulnerability. Malicious adversaries may seek to compromise one or more PMUs in order to effect control decisions that unnecessarily disrupt typical grid operations. One...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:2019 North American Power Symposium (NAPS) pp. 1 - 6
Main Authors: Hart, Philip, Acharya, Sowmya, Wang, Honggang
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Published: IEEE 01.10.2019
Subjects:
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Abstract The wide area monitoring system (WAMS) is critical for power system situational awareness, but represents a growing cybersecurity vulnerability. Malicious adversaries may seek to compromise one or more PMUs in order to effect control decisions that unnecessarily disrupt typical grid operations. One example of a particularly pernicious attack vector is the spoofing or replaying of a fault event using one or more compromised PMUs. This work documents the development and validation of a coherency-based cyberattack detection algorithm that integrates a sliding-window singular value decomposition (SVD) with physics-based partitioning analysis to achieve accurate classification of events. Special consideration is given to discerning a sophisticated fault-replay or fault spoofing attack from actual faults. A software-based cybersecurity testbed has been developed for rigorous testing of the algorithm. The algorithm is further validated using simulated synchrophasor datasets obtained from a MinniWECC 63-bus test system. Results show that the algorithm can successfully detect fault-replay attacks even when over half of the PMUs are compromised.
AbstractList The wide area monitoring system (WAMS) is critical for power system situational awareness, but represents a growing cybersecurity vulnerability. Malicious adversaries may seek to compromise one or more PMUs in order to effect control decisions that unnecessarily disrupt typical grid operations. One example of a particularly pernicious attack vector is the spoofing or replaying of a fault event using one or more compromised PMUs. This work documents the development and validation of a coherency-based cyberattack detection algorithm that integrates a sliding-window singular value decomposition (SVD) with physics-based partitioning analysis to achieve accurate classification of events. Special consideration is given to discerning a sophisticated fault-replay or fault spoofing attack from actual faults. A software-based cybersecurity testbed has been developed for rigorous testing of the algorithm. The algorithm is further validated using simulated synchrophasor datasets obtained from a MinniWECC 63-bus test system. Results show that the algorithm can successfully detect fault-replay attacks even when over half of the PMUs are compromised.
Author Wang, Honggang
Hart, Philip
Acharya, Sowmya
Author_xml – sequence: 1
  givenname: Philip
  surname: Hart
  fullname: Hart, Philip
  organization: GE Global Research,Niskayuna,New York,USA
– sequence: 2
  givenname: Sowmya
  surname: Acharya
  fullname: Acharya, Sowmya
  organization: GE Global Research,Niskayuna,New York,USA
– sequence: 3
  givenname: Honggang
  surname: Wang
  fullname: Wang, Honggang
  organization: GE Global Research,Niskayuna,New York,USA
BookMark eNotj8tOwzAURI0EC1r4AiSUH0iwHT_iZRqeUgVIhXV1Y98Qi9auHG_y90SimsXobEZnVuQyxICE3DNaMUbNw3v7uROqlqzilJnKUEq5ZhdkxTRvGBVUq2uy6eKICYOdyw1M6IpHzGizj6FoDz8x-TweiyGmYjcHO6Z4GmFaqJt7TJAz2N_phlwNcJjw9txr8v389NW9ltuPl7eu3Zae6yaXxinjmAQwCqERWhpYvKzmgx24EDj0hveuka62hisJNaIQtBGIul_C6zW5-9_1iLg_JX-ENO_Pt-o_QehIWA
ContentType Conference Proceeding
DBID 6IE
6IL
CBEJK
RIE
RIL
DOI 10.1109/NAPS46351.2019.9000271
DatabaseName IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings
IEEE Xplore POP ALL
IEEE Xplore All Conference Proceedings
IEEE Xplore
IEEE Proceedings Order Plans (POP All) 1998-Present
DatabaseTitleList
Database_xml – sequence: 1
  dbid: RIE
  name: IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)
  url: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
  sourceTypes: Publisher
DeliveryMethod fulltext_linktorsrc
EISBN 1728104076
9781728104072
EndPage 6
ExternalDocumentID 9000271
Genre orig-research
GroupedDBID 6IE
6IL
CBEJK
RIE
RIL
ID FETCH-LOGICAL-i278t-9d69d15aa96ea84759a201c72fcf244efb92bd85d3c9265a3ee44084ee7b7b723
IEDL.DBID RIE
ISICitedReferencesCount 1
ISICitedReferencesURI http://www.webofscience.com/api/gateway?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=Summon&SrcAuth=ProQuest&DestLinkType=CitingArticles&DestApp=WOS_CPL&KeyUT=000553797300107&url=https%3A%2F%2Fcvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com%2F%23%21%2Fsearch%3Fho%3Df%26include.ft.matches%3Dt%26l%3Dnull%26q%3D
IngestDate Thu Jun 29 18:38:51 EDT 2023
IsDoiOpenAccess false
IsOpenAccess true
IsPeerReviewed false
IsScholarly false
Language English
LinkModel DirectLink
MergedId FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-i278t-9d69d15aa96ea84759a201c72fcf244efb92bd85d3c9265a3ee44084ee7b7b723
OpenAccessLink https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1985688
PageCount 6
ParticipantIDs ieee_primary_9000271
PublicationCentury 2000
PublicationDate 2019-Oct.
PublicationDateYYYYMMDD 2019-10-01
PublicationDate_xml – month: 10
  year: 2019
  text: 2019-Oct.
PublicationDecade 2010
PublicationTitle 2019 North American Power Symposium (NAPS)
PublicationTitleAbbrev NAPS
PublicationYear 2019
Publisher IEEE
Publisher_xml – name: IEEE
Score 1.714358
Snippet The wide area monitoring system (WAMS) is critical for power system situational awareness, but represents a growing cybersecurity vulnerability. Malicious...
SourceID ieee
SourceType Publisher
StartPage 1
SubjectTerms Circuit faults
coherency
Computer crime
Cyberattack
detection algorithm
Detection algorithms
event classification
fault
Mathematical model
Partitioning algorithms
Phasor measurement units
Power systems
replay attack
synchrophasors
WAMS
Title Coherency-Based Detection Algorithm for Synchrophasor Cyberattacks
URI https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9000271
WOSCitedRecordID wos000553797300107&url=https%3A%2F%2Fcvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com%2F%23%21%2Fsearch%3Fho%3Df%26include.ft.matches%3Dt%26l%3Dnull%26q%3D
hasFullText 1
inHoldings 1
isFullTextHit
isPrint
link http://cvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwlV3PS8MwFA5zePCksom_6cGj2dasbZLjNh0epBSmsNvIjxc30E62Tth_70tWJoIXySVpC-UlDd97zfveR8gdbgL8NJyhqg89mqiYUelYRuPEam1Ugj5zqDP7zPNcTKeyaJD7PRcGAELyGXR8N5zl26XZ-F9lXRkOyjDWOeCc77haNek37sluPigmCeKnj_pi2akf_qWaEkBjfPy_152Q9g_7Lir2uHJKGlC2yNDzKPy9LR0i8NjoAaqQRVVGg_e3JYb4848IHdBosi2Nlz6YqzWORlvtqyZXnknfJq_jx5fRE631D-iCcVFRaTNp41QpmYESvjCfQssMZ844RGVwWjJtRWr7RrIsxdkGrx-dAHCNjfXPSLNclnBOIqu4QFcOl0GIRCmnwaY9xY3XKXIYpFyQlrd_9rkrcTGrTb_8-_IVOfJTvMtpuybNarWBG3JovqrFenUb1uUbEW2QnA
linkProvider IEEE
linkToHtml http://cvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwlV1bS8MwFA5jCvqksol3--Cj2dYsveRxm46Jsww2YW8jlxM30E62Tui_96QrE8EXyUvSFspJGr5zmvOdj5A73AT4aVhNZRtalEufUWFZSH1ulNKSo89c1JkdRkkST6diVCH3Oy4MABTJZ9Bw3eIs3yz1xv0qa4rioAxjnb2Ac-Zv2Vol7ddviWbSGY05IqiL-3zRKB__pZtSwEb_6H8vPCb1H_6dN9ohywmpQFojXcekcPdy2kXoMd4DZEUeVep13t-WGOTPPzx0Qb1xnmonfjCXaxz1cuXqJmeOS18nr_3HSW9ASwUEumBRnFFhQmH8QEoRgoxdaT6JlumIWW0Rl8EqwZSJA9PWgoUBzjc4BWkOEClsrH1KqukyhTPiGRnF6MzhQsQxl9IqMEFLRtopFVkMU85Jzdk_-9wWuZiVpl_8ffmWHAwmL8PZ8Cl5viSHbrq3GW5XpJqtNnBN9vVXtlivboo1-gbG6JPj
openUrl ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=proceeding&rft.title=2019+North+American+Power+Symposium+%28NAPS%29&rft.atitle=Coherency-Based+Detection+Algorithm+for+Synchrophasor+Cyberattacks&rft.au=Hart%2C+Philip&rft.au=Acharya%2C+Sowmya&rft.au=Wang%2C+Honggang&rft.date=2019-10-01&rft.pub=IEEE&rft.spage=1&rft.epage=6&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109%2FNAPS46351.2019.9000271&rft.externalDocID=9000271