Cyber-physical attacks in power networks: Models, fundamental limitations and monitor design

Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network components malfunction or measurements corruption caused by an omniscient adver...

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Vydané v:2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference s. 2195 - 2201
Hlavní autori: Pasqualetti, Fabio, Dorfler, Florian, Bullo, Francesco
Médium: Konferenčný príspevok..
Jazyk:English
Vydavateľské údaje: IEEE 01.12.2011
Predmet:
Detectors
Equations
Generators
Load modeling
Mathematical model
Power system dynamics
Security
ISBN:9781612848006, 1612848001
ISSN:0191-2216
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Shrnutí:Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network components malfunction or measurements corruption caused by an omniscient adversary. We model a power system under cyber-physical attack as a linear time-invariant descriptor system with unknown inputs. Our attack model generalizes the prototypical stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and replay attacks. We characterize the fundamental limitations of both static and dynamic procedures for attack detection and identification. Additionally, we design provably-correct (dynamic) detection and identification procedures based on tools from geometric control theory. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of our method through a comparison with existing (static) detection algorithms, and through a numerical study.
ISBN:9781612848006
1612848001
ISSN:0191-2216
DOI:10.1109/CDC.2011.6160641