Evading Defenses to Transferable Adversarial Examples by Translation-Invariant Attacks

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which can mislead classifiers by adding imperceptible perturbations. An intriguing property of adversarial examples is their good transferability, making black-box attacks feasible in real-world applications. Due to the threat of adversari...

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Veröffentlicht in:Proceedings (IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. Online) S. 4307 - 4316
Hauptverfasser: Dong, Yinpeng, Pang, Tianyu, Su, Hang, Zhu, Jun
Format: Tagungsbericht
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: IEEE 01.06.2019
Schlagworte:
Categorization
Codes
Computational modeling
Computer vision
Deep learning
Glass box
Kernel
Pattern recognition
Perturbation methods
Recognition: Detection
Retrieval
Robustness
Security
ISSN:1063-6919
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Zusammenfassung:Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which can mislead classifiers by adding imperceptible perturbations. An intriguing property of adversarial examples is their good transferability, making black-box attacks feasible in real-world applications. Due to the threat of adversarial attacks, many methods have been proposed to improve the robustness. Several state-of-the-art defenses are shown to be robust against transferable adversarial examples. In this paper, we propose a translation-invariant attack method to generate more transferable adversarial examples against the defense models. By optimizing a perturbation over an ensemble of translated images, the generated adversarial example is less sensitive to the white-box model being attacked and has better transferability. To improve the efficiency of attacks, we further show that our method can be implemented by convolving the gradient at the untranslated image with a pre-defined kernel. Our method is generally applicable to any gradient-based attack method. Extensive experiments on the ImageNet dataset validate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Our best attack fools eight state-of-the-art defenses at an 82% success rate on average based only on the transferability, demonstrating the insecurity of the current defense techniques.
ISSN:1063-6919
DOI:10.1109/CVPR.2019.00444