A Two-party certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol without pairing

Authenticated key agreement (AK) protocol is crucial in providing data confidentiality and integrity for subsequent communications among two or more parties over a public network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (I...

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Vydáno v:2009 2nd IEEE International Conference on Computer Science and Information Technology s. 412 - 416
Hlavní autoři: Mengbo Hou, Qiuliang Xu
Médium: Konferenční příspěvek
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: IEEE 01.08.2009
Témata:
authenticated key agreement
Authentication
certificateless-based cryptography
Certification
Computer science
Cryptographic protocols
Galois fields
Identity-based encryption
Information security
perfect forward secrecy
PKG forward secrecy
Public key
Public key cryptography
Resilience
ISBN:1424445191, 9781424445196
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Popis
Shrnutí:Authenticated key agreement (AK) protocol is crucial in providing data confidentiality and integrity for subsequent communications among two or more parties over a public network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional public key cryptography (PKC). Unfortunately, construction of CL-PKC and AK protocols has so far depended on the use of identity-based encryption, which results in the bilinear pairing-based schemes that need costly operations. We present a secure certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol without paring, based on the certificateless encryption scheme proposed by J. Baek et al. It shows that the newly proposed scheme is of nice efficiency and practical. Moreover, it provides perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy and almost all the other known security attributes, such as known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, known session-specific temporary information security, message independence and no key control.
ISBN:1424445191
9781424445196
DOI:10.1109/ICCSIT.2009.5234917