2×2 Zero-Sum Games with Commitments and Noisy Observations

In this paper, 2×2 zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: (1) One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); (2) The leader announces its action, which is observed by its opponent (the follower) through a binary...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Proceedings / IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory S. 2254 - 2259
Hauptverfasser:	Sun, Ke, Perlaza, Samir M., Jean-Marie, Alain
Format:	Tagungsbericht
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	IEEE 25.06.2023
Schlagworte:	Games Information theory Nash equilibrium Noise measurement Sufficient conditions Upper bound
ISSN:	2157-8117
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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